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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LLOYD L. MOORE, : 
Applicant/Appellant, : ! BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
: UTAH STATE INSURANCE FUND 
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AMERICAN COAL COMPANY, aka : > i. 
EMERY MINING CORPORATION, : 
UTAH STATE INSURANCE FUND : 
and SECOND INJURY FUND, : Supreme Court No. 20620 
Defendants/Respondents. : 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
There are two issues presented for review. The first is 
whether the provisions of Section 35-1-77, Utah Code Annotated, 
as amended in 1982, require an Administrative Law Judge of the 
Industrial Commission to set and hold a hearing to determine the 
facts and issues involved when an applicant for workers1 compen-
sation benefits files objections to the report of the medical 
panel in his case. The second is whether the amended statute or 
the law as it existed at the time the applicant initiated proceed-
ings on his claims for workers' compensation benefits ought to be 
applied • 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
The statute whose interpretation is determinative of the 
first issue presented for review is Section 35-1-77, Utah Code 
Annotated (1985 Supp.), which reads as follows: 
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation 
*~~ -i«i«-rv Kv accident, or for death, arising 
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out of or in the course of employment, and 
where the employer or insurance carrier 
denies liability, the commission may refer 
the medical aspects of the case to a medical 
panel appointed by the commission and having 
the qualifications generally applicable to 
the medical panel set forth in Section 
35-2-56. The medical panel shall then make 
such study, take such X-rays and perform such 
tests, including post-mortem examinations 
where authorized by the commission, as it may 
determine and thereafter make a report in 
writing to the commission in a form prescribed 
by the commission, and also make such addi-
tional findings as the commission may require. 
The commission shall promptly distribute full 
copies of the report of the panel to the 
applicant, the employer and the insurance 
carrier by registered mail with return 
receipt requested. Within fifteen days after 
such report is deposited in the United States 
post office, the applicant, the employer or 
the insurance carrier may file with the 
commission objections in writing thereto. If 
no objections are so filed within such 
period, the report shall be deemed admitted 
in evidence and the commission may base its 
finding and decision on the report of the 
panel, but shall not be bound by such report 
if there is other substantial conflicting 
evidence in the case which supports a contrary 
finding by the commission. If objections to 
such report are filed the commission may set 
the case for hearing to determine the facts 
and issues involved, and at such hearing any 
party so desiring may request the commission 
to have the chairman of the medical panel 
present at the hearing for examination and 
cross-examination. For good cause shown the 
commission may order other members of the 
panel, with or without the chairman, to be 
present at the hearing for examination and 
cross-examination. Upon such hearing the 
written report of the panel may be received 
as an exhibit but shall not be considered as 
evidence in the case except as far as it is 
sustained by the testimony admitted. The 
expenses of such study and report by the 
medical panel and of their appearance before 
the commission shall be paid out of the fund 
provided for by section 35-1-68. 
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APPLICABLE RULES 
In order to prevent an arbitrary use of the discretion 
granted the Commission in Section 35-1-77, the Commission promul-
gated rules and regulations to govern procedure under the statute. 
The relevant provision of the Commission's "Guidelines For 
Utilization of Medical Panel" reads as follows: 
A hearing on objections to the panel report 
may be scheduled if there is a proffer of 
conflicting medical testimony or an indication 
that all relevant medical evidence was not 
considered by the panel. 
Workers1 Compensation Rules and Regulations - Procedure, 
1.2.33(c). The Rules and Regulations are reproduced in full in 
the addendum to this brief, as is Section 35-1-10, Utah Code Ann. 
(1953), pursuant to which the Commission adopts and publishes 
rules and regulations governing procedure before it. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arose upon appellant Lloyd L. Moore's claims for 
medical expenses and compensation for time off work from his 
employer, American Coal Company. The injury on which he bases his 
claims occurred on April 6, 1979. (R. 373.) An Administrative 
Law Judge of the Industrial Commission of Utah considered the 
matter in an evidentiary hearing June 28, 1984, and appointed a 
medical panel to review the medical issues involved. (R. 377 
through 389.) The panel found no medical connection between Mr. 
Moore's industrial injury and the medical treatments or time off 
work for which he sought compensation, (R. 398 through 401.) Mr. 
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Moore objected to the panelfs finding, stating that in the opinion 
of his treating physicians, the panel's conclusion was incorrect. 
(R. 404.) In the absence of a proffer of the physicians' opinion, 
the Administrative Law Judge admitted the panel report into 
evidence, adopted its findings as his own, and denied Mr. Moore's 
claims. (R. 405 through 407.) Mr. Moore sought the 
Industrial Commission's review of the judge's order on the 
ground that Section 35-1-77, Utah Code Annotated, requires a 
"medical panel hearing" to be held when requested by a 
party who objects to the findings of the medical panel. (R. 409 
through 410.) The Commission denied the motion for review and 
affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's order. (R. 414.) Mr. 
Moore then petitioned this Court for review. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant, Lloyd L. Moore, slipped on a piece of coal 
and twisted his right leg (R. 16) while in the employ of the 
respondent American Coal Company on April 6, 1979. (R. 1.) Mr. 
Moore had injured his right knee while in the military in the 
1950's and, in approximately 1965, doctors performed a medial 
meniscectomy on his right knee. (R. 398.) Following his 
industrial injury in 1979, he underwent posteromedial recon-
struction of the knee in June of 1979, anterior cruciate ligament 
reconstruction in June of 1980, and arthroscopic debridement of 
the lateral joint compartment of the knee in September 1981. (R. 
324, 325 and 362.) The respondent Utah State Insurance Fund, as 
American Coal Company's workers' compensation insurer, paid the 
A 
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medical expenses of the 1979 and 1980 surgeries, and compensation 
for temporary total disability from April 6, 1979 through April 5, 
1981. (R. 9.) When the State Insurance Fund denied liability for 
the September 1981 surgery, and terminated compensation, Mr. Moore 
filed a claim with the Industrial Commission and a hearing on the 
matter was held November 23, 1981. (R. 10-58.) Following the 
hearing, a medical panel was appointed to examine Mr. Moore and 
his medical records. (R. 319-320.) The medical panel found that 
the 1979 and 1981 surgeries were all required as a result of the 
industrial injury, but specifically stated that "no further 
medical therapy, physical therapy or surgery is indicated as a 
result of the industrial injury.ff (R. 326.) In January and 
September of 1984, Mr. Moore underwent further surgery on his 
right knee, a Coventry osteotomy in January and a total knee 
replacement in September. (R. 398-401.) When he presented his 
claim for the January surgery to the State Insurance Fund, he was 
denied. (R. 374-375.) He again requested a hearing. The 
hearing was held June 28, 1984, and Mr. Moore's medical records 
were introduced into evidence. (R. 377-389). The Administrative 
Law Judge referred him to a medical panel, which met January 10, 
1985, and again examined Mr. Moore and once more reviewed his 
records. (R. 392-393.) The panel found that the surgeries which 
were performed subsequent to the initial hearing were not necessi-
tated by the industrial injury and that Mr. Moore had not been 
temporarily totally disabled as a result of that injury since the 
date the panel had previously found his condition to have 
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stabilized, June 13, 1981. (R. 398-401.) Mr. Moore objected to 
the medical panel report "for the reason that the conclusion of 
the panel that the total knee replacement operation was unrelated 
to his April, 1979 industrial injury is, in the opinion of his 
treating physicians, clearly incorrect." (R. 404.) 
The opinions of Mr. Moore's treating physicians were not 
proffered with his objection, and the Administrative Law Judge 
issued findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order in which 
he denied the objections and adopted the findings of the medical 
panel as his own. (R. 405-408.) Mr. Moore then made a motion for 
review of the matter by the Industrial Commission "for the reason 
that the order was entered despite the claimant having filed an 
objection to findings of the medical panel and requesting that a 
medical panel hearing be scheduled." (R. 409.) The Industrial 
Commission denied the motion. (R. 414.) This appeal followed, 
appellant arguing that "a medical panel hearing is mandatory 
i 
under Section 35-1-77, Utah Code Annotated when objections are 
filed to a medical panel report." (Brief of Appellant, p. 3.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS I 
I 
Section 35-1-77, Utah Code Annotated, as amended in 1982, 
provides that the Industrial Commission may set a case for hearing i 
to determine the facts and issues involved when a party objects to 
the findings reported by a medical panel to whom the Commission 
has referred the medical aspects of the case. It is within the * 
Commission's discretion to set a case for wjjat is termed a 
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"medical panel hearing." Under the amended Section 35-1-77, the 
hearing is not mandatory. The decision to set a hearing on 
objections is governed by the "Guidelines for Utilization of 
Medical Panel" adopted by the Commission as part of its rules and 
regulations governing procedure. The Guidelines provide that a 
hearing be set "if there is a proffer of conflicting medical 
testimony or an indication that all relevant medical evidence was 
not considered by the panel." When neither the proffer nor the 
indication described in the Guidelines arise in a case, the 
Commission properly uses its discretion in determining the matter 
without setting a medical panel hearing. 
II 
Remedial statutes which do not create new rights or destroy 
existing rights are applied retrospectively to accrued or pending 
actions. Marshall v. Industrial Commission of State of Utah, 704 
P.2d 581, 582 (Utah 1985). Section 35-1-77 does not enlarge, 
eliminate, or destroy existing rights. Therefore, the 1982 
amended section, rather than the section which required the 
setting of a medical panel hearing, applied to Mr. Moore's case. 
The Administrative Law Judge and the Commission acted within 
their discretion and according to established rules of procedure 
in ruling on the case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SECTION 35-1-77, UTAH CODE ANN. (SUPP. 1985), 
LEAVES THE DECISION TO SET OBJECTIONS TO 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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MEDICAL PANEL REPORTS FOR HEARING WITHIN THE 
COMMISSIONS DISCRETION; THEREFORE, THE FACT 
THAT THE COMMISSION AFFIRMED THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S DECISION WITHOUT 
FURTHER HEARING ON THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT 
ENTITLE THE APPELLANT TO REVERSAL OF THE 
COMMISSION'S DECISION. 
Section 35-1-77, Utah Code Ann., sets forth the procedures 
to be followed by the Industrial Commission of Utah upon the 
filing by an employee of a claim for compensation when the 
employer or its insurance carrier denies liability for the 
employee's claim. It provides that a medical panel may be 
appointed to determine the medical aspects of the case; that the 
panel shall study the case and make a report in writing on its 
medical aspects; that the report shall be distributed to the 
parties, who are given fifteen days within which to object to the 
report; and, that if there are no objections, the report shall be 
deemed admitted in evidence. The sixth sentence of Section 
35-1-77 contains the material which is pertinent to this appeal: 
1 
If objections to such report are filed the 
commission may set the case for hearing to 
determine the facts and issues involved, and 
at such hearing any party so desiring may 
request the commission to have the chairman 
of the medical panel present at the hearing ( 
for examination and cross-examination, 
(Emphasis added.) Prior to 1982, the sixth sentence of Section 
35-1-77 read as it appears in appellant's brief: 
i 
If objections to such report are filed it 
shall be the duty of the commission to set 
the case for hearing within thirty days to 
determine the facts and issues involved . . . 
In 1982, the legislature amended the sixth sentence of Section I 
35-1-77, substituting "the commission may11 for "it shall be the 
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duty of the commission to." The Commission then adopted and 
published guidelines which it and its Administrative Law Judges 
follow to determine whether or not to set a hearing on objections 
in a given case. Therefore, at the time the Administrative Law 
Judge considered Mr. Moore's objections to the findings of the 
medical panel, in February and March of 1984, it was within his 
discretion to set the case for further hearing or make a decision 
based on the evidence before him. The Administrative Law Judge 
analyzed the case in accordance with the Commission's guidelines, 
and finding no proffer of conflicting medical testimony or 
indication that all relevant medical evidence was not considered 
by the panel, he did not set a hearing on Mr. Moore's objections. 
Mr. Moore attempts to rely on the language of the unamended 
version of Section 35-1-77, making no reference to the change 
wrought by the 1982 amendment, and basing his argument that he is 
entitled to reversal of the Industrial Commission's decision on 
Johnson v. Moore Business Forms, 694 P.2d 597 (Utah 1984), Schmidt 
v. Industrial Commission^ 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980), and Lipman v. 
Industrial Commission, 592 P.2d 616 (Utah 1969). Each of these 
cases dealt with the issue whether convening a medical panel was 
mandatory under statutes which contained the language "shall 
refer" or "shall appoint" a medical panel. Both Lipman and 
Schmidt ruled medical panels mandatory under Section 35-1-77 of 
the Workers1 Compensation Act. Johnson held medical panels 
mandatory under Section 35-2-56(2) of the Utah Occupational 
Disease Disability Law. Mr. Moore argues that just as the 
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appointment of a medical panel was found mandatory in these cases, 
setting a medical panel hearing when objection is made to the 
panel report is also mandatory. However, in Johnson, the Court 
noted that in 1982 the legislature amended Section 35-1-77 to make 
convening of a medical panel discretionary • 694 P.2d 597, 599 
footnote 1. The legislature substituted "may" for "shall" in the 
first sentence of Section 35-1-77, which deals with referral to a 
medical panel. According to the Court in Johnson, this amendment 
"effectively reversed Schmidt" on the issue whether referral to a 
medical panel is mandatory under the section* Id. 
The substitution of "may" for "shall" in the first sentence 
of Section 35-1-77 gave the Commission the discretion to convene 
a medical panel. So too, the substitution of "may" for "it shall 
be the duty of the commission to" in the sixth sentence of 
Section 35-1-77 leaves the decision whether to set a case for 
further hearing upon objections to the medical panel report 
within the Commission's discretion. The Commission's discretion 
is governed by the "Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel" 
adopted by the Commission. The "Guidelines" read, in pertinent 
part: 
A hearing on objections to the panel report 
may be scheduled if there is a proffer of 
conflicting medical testimony or an indication 
that all relevant medical evidence was not i 
considered by the panel. 
Workers1 Compensation Rules and Regulations - Procedure, 
1.2.33(c). Mr. Moore is not "entitled" to a hearing on 
objections, nor is he "entitled" to have the Commission's decision 
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reversed, as he argues in his brief* The Commission's decision 
complied fully with the law. There was not a proffer of conflict-
ing medical testimony nor was there an indication that all 
relevant medical evidence was not considered by the panel in this 
case* The records of Mr* Moore's treating physicians were 
introduced as evidence at his hearing and forwarded to the panel. 
In light of these facts, the Commission's decision cannot be said 
to be arbitrary, capricious, wholly without cause, or contrary to 
the one inevitable conclusion from the evidence. Rather, it is 
supported by the evidence and the reports of two qualified 
medical panels. It was made in accordance with the statute, and 
in accordance with the rules adopted by the Commission to prevent 
any abuse of the discretion Section 35-1-77 allows. It should not 
be displaced on review. 
POINT II 
THE 1982 AMENDMENT TO THE PROVISIONS OF 
SECTION 35-1-77 PERTINENT TO THIS CASE IS 
PROCEDURAL IN NATURE AND APPLIES RETRO-
SPECTIVELY TO CLAIMS SUCH AS APPELLANT'S 
WHICH ACCRUED OR WERE PENDING PRIOR TO THE 
TIME OF THE AMENDMENT. 
Mr. Moore's brief does not mention the 1982 amendments to 
Section 35-1-77, which fact leads to the assumption that he 
thinks the unamended Section, found in the bound 1953 volume of 
Utah Code Annotated, controls his case. The injury to which he 
ascribes the need for his 1984 medical treatment occurred in 1979 
and the Industrial Commission first reviewed claims stemming from 
it in 1981. The argument that the law in effect at the initiation 
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of proceedings is the law that controls throughout a case is one 
the State and the Department of Social Services likewise made in 
State, Dept. of Social Services v. Higgs. 656 P.2d 998 (Utah 
1982). There, the State contested the district court's dismissal 
of its complaint for review of an administrative order sustaining 
certain employee grievances filed by the defendants. The 
statutory grievance procedures in effect at the time the defend-
ants initiated their action had provided for a five-step 
administrative review of employees' grievances and authorized 
either the State or employeeCs) to seek judicial review of the 
administrative decision following the fifth step which was a 
hearing before a state hearing officer. During the administrative 
proceedings, however, the grievance statute was amended to 
establish a sixth level of administrative review before a person-
nel review board. The district court applied the amended statute 
and dismissed the State's complaint, ruling the State had failed 
to exhaust its administrative remedies. The State appealed, and 
this Court analyzed its arguments on appeal as follows: 
The State argues that the law in effect at 
the time the legal proceedings are initiated 
controls all the proceedings from that point 
forward. It relies for that proposition on 
Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Trustees. Inc. , 
8 Utah 2d 101, 329 P.2d 398 (1958); McCarrev 
v. Utah State Teachers' Retirement Bd.» 111 
Utah 251, 177 P.2d 725 (1947); and In re 
Ingraham's Estate, 106 Utah 337, 148 P.2d 340 
(1944). These authorities state the 
well-established rule that statutory enact-
ments which affect substantive or vested 
rights generally operate only prospectively. 
Under the cases cited, the substantive law to 
be applied throughout an action is the law in 
effect at the date the action was initiated. 
12 
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State v. Carney, 163 Ohio St. 159, 126 N.E.2d 
449 (1955). Since the State had the right of 
judicial review upon completion of Step 5 
under the law in effect at the initiation of 
the administrative proceedings, the State 
asserts that it may not be deprived of that 
right by a subsequent change in the law. 
656 P.2d 998, 1000. The Court's response to this argument was: 
However, procedural statutes enacted sub-
sequent to the initiation of a suit which do 
not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or 
contractual rights apply not only to future 
actions, but also to accrued and pending 
actions as well . . . . Generally, new 
procedural rules do not affect proceedings 
completed prior to enactment • • • . Further 
proceedings in a pending case are governed by 
the new law • • • • 
656 P.2d, 998, 1001 (citations omitted.) As in Higgs. in this 
case the statute outlining the procedures to be followed in 
resolving Mr. Moore's claims was amended during the pendency of 
and proceedings on his claims. The amendments to Section 35-1-77 
did not enlarge, eliminate or destroy any vested right or change 
the substantive law of the Workers' Compensation Act. Mr. Moore's 
rights to potential recovery of medical expenses and payment for 
time off work have not been diminished or altered. The proceed-
ings before the Industrial Commission on his claims were governed 
by the new law and neither the Administrative Law Judge nor the 
Commission was required to set or hold a hearing on his objections 
to the medical panel report. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 35-1-77 of the Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code 
Annotated (1985 Supp.), was amended in 1982 to make the setting of 
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a medical panel hearing discretionary. The amendment, varying 
only the established procedure for review of workers1 claims, 
operated in furtherance of a remedy which already existed. It did 
not create new rights or destroy the existing rights of the 
appellant herein. As the Court stated in Marshall v. Industrial 
Commission of State of Utah, 704 P.2d 581 (Utah 1985), 
This Court has consistently held that in 
worker's compensation cases the benefits 
to be awarded to an injured worker are to be 
determined on the basis of the law as it 
existed at the time of the injury. As the 
Court said in Oakland Construction Co. v. 
Industrial Commission: "[A] later statute or 
amendment should not be applied in a retro-
active manner to deprive a party of his 
rights or impose greater liability upon him." 
We recognize that this rule differs from the 
general rule followed in this jurisdiction 
which is that "the substantive law to be 
applied throughout an action is the law in 
effect at the date the action was initiated." 
(Emphasis added.) 
A contrary rule to both of the above applies, 
however, to statutes which operate in further-
ance of a remedy already existing and which 
neither create new rights nor destroy existing 
rights. Those remedial statutes are applied 
retrospectively to accrued or pending actions 
to further the legislature's remedial purpose 
unless a contrary legislative intent is 
manifested . 
704 P.2d 581, 582 (emphasis added.) 
Therefore, on February 6, 1985, when the appellant herein 
objected to the report of the medical panel to which his claims 
had been referred, the Administrative Law Judge presiding over 
his case did not have a duty to set his objections for hearing. 
It was within his discretion, as controlled by established 
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guidelines, to 'set a hearing on objections. Absent a proffer of 
conflicting medical testimony or an indication that all relevant 
medical evidence had not been considered by the panel, he adopted 
the findings of the medical panel report as his own and denied Mr. 
Moorefs claims. On review of his decision, the Industrial 
Commission adopted his findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
affirming his denial. On review, it was also within the 
Commission's discretion, pursuant to amended Section 35-1-77, to 
set the matter for further hearing. 
On review by this Court, the Commission's findings should be 
displaced only if they are arbitrary, capricious, wholly without 
cause, contrary to the one inevitable conclusion from the 
evidence, or without any substantial evidence to support them. 
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888, 890 (Utah 1981). In 
this case, the Commission's findings were not arbitrary or 
capricious but within its discretion under Section 35-1-77, and 
were based on the evidence accumulated during two hearings, the 
findings of two qualified, duly appointed medical panels, together 
with records from all of the appellant's treating physicians. 
Given these facts and the controlling authorities cited above, the 
Commission's findings should be affirmed. 
DATED thia~>N (' day of January, 1986. 
BLACK & MOORE 
_J^/ 
James R. Black 
H 
/ : /•••• . • . 
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WORKERS1 COMPENSATION 
RULES AND REGULATIONS - PROCEDURE 
Adopted in Accordance with the Provisions of 35-1-10 and 35-2-5. 
All changes herein effective 8/17/84. 
1.1.1. DEFINITIONS: 
(a) "Commission" - means the Industrial Commission 
of Utah. 
(b) "Applicant/Plaintiff" - means an injured 
employee or his/her dependents or any person 
seeking relief or claiming benefits under the 
Workers1 Compensation and/or Occupational 
Disease and Disability Laws. 
(c) "Defendant" - means employers and includes 
insurance carriers and self insured, and the 
Second Injury Fund. 
(d) "Administrative Law Judge" - means a person 
duly designated by the Industrial Commission 
to hear and determine disputed or other cases 
under the provisions of Title 35, Chapters 1 
and 2. 
(e) "Insurance Carrier" - includes all insurance 
companies writing Workers1 Compensation and 
Occupational Disease and Disability Insurance, 
the State Insurance Fund and Self Insurers 
who are granted self-insuring privileges by 
the Industrial Commission* In all cases 
involving no insurance coverage by the 
employer, the term "Insurance Carrier" 
includes the employer. 
1.2.33. GUIDELINES FOR UTILIZATION OF MEDICAL PANEL - Pursuant 
to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A. the Commission adopts the 
following guidelines in determining the necessity of 
submitting a case to a medical panel: 
(a) A panel will be utilized where: 
1. One or more significant medical issues 
are involved. 
Generally a significant medical issue 
must be shown by conflicting medical 
reports. The issues of permanent partial 
impairment will be considered significant 
18 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
if conflicting medical reports vary with 
a rating more than 5% of the whole 
person; or if the temporary total cut 
off date varies more than 90 days; or if 
the amount of medical expense in contro-
versy is more than $2,000. 
2. In the opinion of the Commission the 
medical issues are so intertwined 
with the events that a determination of 
whether an accident has occurred cannot 
be made without first resolving medical 
consideration. 
(b) Where in the opinion of the Commission, the 
evidence is insufficient for the Commission to make 
a final determination, the Commission may require 
an independent medical evaluation* Costs to be 
assessed against the employer and/or Second Injury 
Fund. 
(c) A hearing on objections to the panel report may be 
scheduled if there is a proffer of conflicting 
medical testimony or an indication that all 
relevant medical evidence was not considered by 
the panel. 
(d) The Commission may authorize an injured worker to 
be examined by another physician for the purpose 
of obtaining a further medical examination or 
evaluation pertaining to the medical issues 
involved, and to obtain a report addressing these 
medical issues in all cases where: 
1. The treating physician has failed or 
refused to give an impairment rating. 
2. The employer or doctor considers the 
claim to be non-industrial. 
3. A substantial injustice may occur without 
such further evaluation. 
10. RULES FOR PROCEDURE: 
Subject to the provisions of this title, the 
Commission shall adopt and publish rules and 
regulations governing procedure before it, and 
shall prescribe forms of notices and manner of 
serving the same in all claims for compensation, 
and may change the same from time to time in its 
19 
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35-1-10 discretion. Such rules and regulations shall 
(cont.) include provisions for procedures in the 
nature of conferences in order to dispose of 
cases informally, or to expedite claims 
adjudication, narrow issues and simplify the 
methods of proof at hearings. 
20 
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JOHNSON v. MOORE BUSINESS FORMS 
Cite ax 694 ?2d 597 (Utah 1984) 
Utah 597 
amount necessary to accomplish that objec-
tive as specifically directed by the judg-
ment, the plaintiffs themselves had the 
work done after the entry of the trial 
court's decree. The defendant objected to 
plaintiffs* actions when he filed the motion 
to amend the judgment. No relief was 
granted. 
The trial court's order was clear and 
snequivocal; the defendant was entitled to 
a money payment from the plaintiff so that 
the grading could be accomplished in a 
reasonable manner according to the di-
rections of the defendant and not as the 
plaintiffs saw fit to do; Since the work 
was done after the conclusion of the trial, 
the record is devoid of the nature and ex-
tent of the work performed by the plain-
tiffs. Accordingly, we remand this case to 
the trial court for a determination of what 
amount, if any, is owed by plaintiffs to the 
defendant for the purpose of having the 
defendant's parcel graded in a manner that 
s in reasonable conformity with the intent 
and purpose of the decree if it is not now. 
The decree of partition is affirmed; the 
case is remanded for further proceedings in 
accordance with this opinion. No costs. 
HALL, C.J., and HOWE, DURHAM and 
ZIMMERMAN, JJ.f concur. 
KEY NUM81R SYSTEM $ 
law. The administrative law judge dis-
missed claim, and the Industrial Commis-
sion affirmed. The Supreme Court, Zim-
merman, J., held that administrative law 
judge was required to call medical panel to 
decide extent and causation of any disabili-
ty upon claimant's assertion that repeated 
trauma on job caused tenosynovitis. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Workers' Compensation <®=>1730 
Employee's claim, under the occupa-
tional disease disability law, of permanent 
partial disability caused by tenosynovitis of 
the wrist required that medical panel be 
called by administrative law judge to deter-
mine extent and causation of any disability, 
where employee asserted, through her tes-
timony and letter from her doctor, that 
repeated trauma of twisting motion re-
quired by her job caused tenosynovitis. 
U.C.A.1953, 35-2-1 to 35-2-65, 35-2-27(25). 
2. Workers' Compensation <3=>547 
Employee claiming partial disability 
under occupational disease disability law 
was not required to show identifiable acci-
dent as prerequisite to recovery; such 
showing is only required for claims under 
Workers' Compensation Act. U.C.A.1953, 
35-1-1 et seq., 35-2-1 et seq. 
Linda B. JOHNSON, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v, 
MOORE BUSINESS FORMS, INA/Aetna 
and the Industrial Commission of Utah, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 19630. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec- 3, 11)84. 
Employee brought partial disability 
daim under occupational disease disability 
Arthur F. Sandack, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and appellant. 
Gilbert Martinez, Shaun Howell, Robert 
Shaughnessy, Frank V. Nelson, Asst. Attys. 
Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendants and 
respondents. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice. 
The issue in this review from the Indus-
trial Commission is whether an administra-
tive law judge can dispose of a claim of 
permanent partial disability under the Utah 
Occupational Disease Disability Law with-
out calling a medical panel. 
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Mrs. Johnson, an employee of Moore 
Business Forms in Logan, Utah, brought 
this partial disability claim under the Utah 
Occupational Disease Disability Law (the 
"Act"). Utah Code Ann., 1953, § 35-2-1 to 
-2-65 (1974 ed. & Supp.1983). She alleged 
that her assembly line job caused her to 
suffer tenosynovitis of the left wrist, re-
sulting in permanent partial disability. 
Her job consisted of wrapping and packing 
paper forms and involved repetitive twist-
ing motions with both her hands. The ad-
ministrative law judge heard evidence of 
the work she did and the motions and 
stresses to which her hands and wrists 
were subjected. The judge rejected her 
claim* finding that Mrs. Johnson had not 
shown that her tenosynovitis was "due to 
continual pressure or friction or to re-
peated trauma or vibration of tools," as 
required by section 35-2-27(25) of the Act. 
The Commission affirmed. Because that 
finding was made without first convening a 
medical panel as required by section 35-2-
56(2) of the Act, we reverse. 
Sections 35-2-27(25) and 35-2-56(1) of 
the Act provide that one suffering from 
tenosynovitis of the wrist "due to continual 
pressure or friction or repeated trauma or 
vibration of tools" resulting in permanent 
partial disability is entitled to compensation 
if that condition is "caused or contributed 
to" by an occupational disease or injury to 
health. Mrs. Johnson made exactly this 
claim. The Act requires that when such a 
claim is filed with the Commission, "the 
commission shall appoint an impartial 
medical panel . . . , and such medical panel 
shall make such study, take such X-rays 
and perform such tests as the panel may 
determine... ." Utah Code Ann., 1953, 
§ 35-2-56(2) (Supp.1983) (emphasis added). 
Following such study, the panel must re-
port to the Commission both (i) the extent 
of any permanent partial disability and (ii) 
whether the disability, in whole or in part, 
resulted from an occupational disease. Id. 
Despite the clear requirement of the stat-
ute that upon the mere filing of such a 
claim a medical panel "shall" be convened, 
the administrative law judge took it upon 
himself to hold a hearing, consider the evi-
dence, including the supportive medical 
opinion of Mrs. Johnson's doctor, and make 
findings of fact and conclusions of law that 
Mrs. Johnson's tenosynovitis did not result 
from any of the causes enumerated in sec-
tion 35-2-27(25), including "friction" or 
"repeated trauma." He then dismissed her 
claim. 
[1] The administrative law judge 
seemed to be operating under the unspoken 
premise that not every claim filed that al-
leges the statutory elements requires con-
vening a medical panel; only those cases 
that pass some threshold test of meritori-
ousness established by the administrative 
law judge may go forward. That interpre-
tation of the statute is contrary to the plain 
language of section 35-2-56(2) and, fur-
thermore, is flatly contrary to this Court's 
holdings in Schmidt v. Industrial Com-
mission, Utah, 617 P.2d 693, 695-96 (1980), 
and Lipman v. Industrial Commission, 
Utah, 592 P.2d 616, 618 (1979). In those 
cases, we ruled that similar language in the 
Workers' Compensation Act required the 
convening of a medical panel in all cases. 
Utah Code Ann., 1953, § 35-1-77 (1974 ed.). 
The instant case presents an even more 
compelling reason than existed in Schmidt 
for applying the statute literally. Section 
35-2-56(2) of the Utah Occupational Dis-
ease Disability Law includes language de-
scribing the legislature's purpose in requir-
ing that all questions of causation and dis-
ability raised by a claim be referred to a 
medical panel, language that was absent 
from the parallel section of the Workers' 
Compensation Act construed in Schmidt 
In section 35-2-56(2) the legislature specifi-
cally found that these questions present 
"highly technical" issues and that the "dif-
ficult task" of dealing with these issues 
"should be placed in the hands of physi-
cians specially trained for the care and 
treatment of the occupational disease in-
volved." Given this legislative finding, we 
are not free to depart from the interpreta-
tion placed upon the similar language in 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATE v. GEHR1NG 
Cite as 694 P.2d 599 (Utah 1984) 
Schmidt, despite the fact that the legisla-
ture later amended the Workers' Compen-
sation Act to delete the requirement that a 
medical panel be convened in every case.1 
In the present case, Mrs. Johnson's claim 
met the required statutory minimum to 
trigger the convening of a medical panel. 
Section 35-2-27(25) of the Act requires that 
to be compensable tenosynovitis of the 
wrist must be caused, inter alia, by job-re-
hted continual "friction" or "repeated trau-
ma." Mrs. Johnson claimed that job-relat-
ed repeated trauma caused tenosynovitis of 
ber wrist. She testified about the repeti-
tive twisting wrist movements required by 
ber job and produced a letter from her 
doctor, Dr. Hyde, opining that the require-
ments of her job played a causative role in 
her wrist problems. Once she made this 
showing, a medical panel had to be called 
» report on whether the continual twisting 
motions required by Mrs. Johnson's job 
constituted "friction" or "repeated trauma" 
and whether this trauma eventually result-
ed in her tenosynovitis. 
12] The administrative law judge invad-
ed the province of the medical panel when, 
without input from a panel, he found that 
Mrs. Johnson's job did not involve the stat-
utorily required pressure, friction, trauma, 
cr vibration.2 
We reverse the administrative law 
pige's holding and remand for further 
proceedings before a properly called medi-
cal panel. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
L In 1982, the legislature amended section 35-1-
77 to make convening of a medical panel discre-
tionary under the Workers' Compensation Act. 
1932 Utah Laws ch. 41 § 1. This amendment 
effectively reversed Schmidt on this issue. 
However, it is worth noting that no such change 
•*as made in the similar language used in sec-
tion 35-2-52(2) of the Utah Occupational Dis-
ease Disability Law, perhaps because the legisla-
ture thought the latter act required more sophis-
ticated determinations, best made only with ex-
pert assistance. 
Utah 599 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Stanley LeRoy GEHRING, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 19790. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 3, 1984. 
Defendant was convicted of rape in the 
Second District Court, Davis County, Doug-
las L. Cornaby, J., and defendant appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that: 
(1) evidence was sufficient to support con-
viction; (2) trial court's failure to order 
production of bed on which rape allegedly 
occurred did not prejudice defendant; and 
(3) unavailability of witness did not entitle 
defendant to new trial. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <3=>1159.2(6) 
Supreme Court will sustain criminal 
conviction when there is any evidence, in-
cluding reasonable inferences that can be 
drawn from it, from which findings of all 
requisite elements of crime can be reason-
ably made. 
2. Rape ®=>1 
Emission of semen is not necessary to 
the crime of rape. U.C.A.1953, 76-5-
407(3). 
2. In his findings, the administrative law judge 
also stressed the fact that nothing unusual or 
accidental in nature had occurred on the day 
Mrs. Johnson first reported pain. That fact is 
irrelevant. It is only when the injury com-
plained of does not lit under the Utah Occupa-
tional Disease Disability Law and is dealt with 
under the Workers' Compensation Act that the-
claimant must show an identifiable accident as 
a prerequisite to recovery. See Pintar v. Indus-
trial Commission, 14 Utah 2d 276, 277, 382 P.2d 
414 (1963). 
tv: 
# 
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nary duties of his employment, he is eligible 
Douglas L. SCHMIDT, Plaintiff, for compensation. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
The INDUSTRIAL COMIVIISSION OF 
UTAH, Kenway Engineering, Inc., and 
Industrial Indemnity, Defendants. 
No. 16097. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 8, 1980. 
Injured worker appealed from an order 
of the Industrial Commission which denied 
his application for disability compensation. 
The Supreme Court, Maughan, J., held that: 
(1) administrative law judge erred in con-
cluding that no "accident" occurred for 
which claimant could be granted compensa-
tion; (2) referral of medical aspects of the 
case to medical panel was mandatory; and 
(3) evidence was erroneously excluded on 
basis of hearsay rule. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Stewart, J., concurred in the result. 
Wilkins, J., filed concurring opinion. 
Crockett, C. J., filed dissenting opinion 
in which Hall, J., joined. 
1. Workers* Compensation c=>517 
Claimant's internal failure brought 
about by exertion in the course of employ-
ment could be "accident" within meaning of 
workmen's compensation statute, without 
requirement that the injury result from 
some incident which happened suddenly and 
was identifiable at definite time and place. 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Workers' Compensation c=>568 
Injury received by employee may be 
accidental even though exertion is that re-
quired in ordinary course of employment. 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
3. Workers' Compensation c=»568 
If employee incurs unexpected injuries, 
including internal failures, caused by ordi-
4. Workers' Compensation @=>597 
Workmen's compensation statute re-
quires existence of causal connection be-
tween injury and employment. U.C.A.1953, 
35-1-45. 
5. Workers' Compensation <*»1730 
When accidental injury has occurred, 
submission to medical panel of medical as-
pects of the case, including those involving 
causation, is mandatory. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-
77. 
6. Workers' Compensation <3=>1385 
Hearsay rule has no application in pro-
ceeding before Industrial Commission; 
Commission and its hearing officers may 
receive and consider any hearsay evidence 
presented to it. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-88. 
7. Workers' Compensation <§=>1385 
Administrative law judge erred in ex-
cluding certain evidence presented in work-
men's compensation proceeding on basis of 
hearsay rule. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-88. 
Jay A. Meservy of Verhaaren & Meservy, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. 
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen. and Floyd 
G. Astin, Asst. Atty. Gen., K. Allan Zabel, 
Stewart L. Poelman, Salt Lake City, for 
defendants. 
MAUGHAN, Justice: 
The plaintiff, Douglas L. Schmidt, ap-
peals from an order of the Industrial Com-
mission denying his application for disabili-
ty compensation. We reverse the order and 
remand the matter to the Commission for 
further proceedings. All statutory refer-
ences are to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended. 
Douglas L. Schmidt began working for 
the defendant, Kenway Engineering, Inc., 
October 25, 1976, as a rough-cut sawman. 
His principal employment duty was the cut-
ting of steel to various sizes for use in the 
shop. The steel pieces he was required to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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handle varied in weight from a few ounces 
to as much as 200 pounds. While an over-
head crane was present in the shop its use 
t 1 U .tMovnilahlp 
617 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
memorandum in support of his motion for 
review, the Industrial Commission denied 
head crane was present in the shop its use the plaintiff's motion and affirmed the ac-
by other employees rendered it unavailable tions of the administrative law judge, 
to the plaintiff at various times. When the
 T h e i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d o n a p p e a i c o n c e r n 
crane was unavailable the demands of the
 t h e administrative law judge's conclusion 
position required the plaintiff to move the
 n o . . a c c i d e n t» ^ ^ ^ for which the plain-
heavy pieces alone or with the aid of fellow
 t i f f c o u l d b e ^ c o m p e n s a t i o n ( f a i l u r e 
employees. The plaintiff testified at the
 o f l h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l a w j u d g e to r e f e r t h e 
Commission Hearing it was a common oc-
 m e d i c a l a s p e c t s o f t h e c a s e t o a m e d i c a l 
currence in carrying the larger pieces for
 x a n d t h e e x d u s i o n o f c e r U i n e v i d e n c e 
one of the individuals involved to suddenly ^
 b t h e l a i n t i f f a t t h e h e a r i 
drop the piece. This would result in the
 r 
other person absorbing the shock of the f Concerning the first issue, the plaintiff 
™otal hitting the floor. i candidly explained prior to and at the hear-
^nor HP could not pinpoint any specific time 
metal hitting the floor 
The plaintiff, a 21 year old male, had a 
prior history of back disorders. As an ado-
lescent he had contracted Scheurmann's dis-
ease, which resulted in severe pain in his 
back involving the Ti l , T12 and LI verte-
brae. This osteochrondrosis was juvenile in 
nature and the plaintiff testified that from 
a year to a year and a half prior to his 
accepting employment at Kenway Engi-
neering he experienced no difficulties or 
problems with his back. 
However, by February 1977, the plaintiff 
was having significant problems with his 
back. He testified initial soreness began in 
December of 1976, increased gradually in 
intensity and duration through January and 
into February. He then went to a doctor 
for care. X-rays taken at that time 
showed a spondylolysis in the lower lumbar 
region and a possible appendicolith. Fol-
lowing additional x-rays confirming the ex-
istence of the appendicolith the plaintiff 
underwent an appendectomy. After recov-
canaiaiy W|JUHUVU
 Y ._ 
ing he could not pinpoint any specific ti e 
or occurrence as the origin of his present 
back problems. The judge explained in his 
findings of facU 
"The application did not specify a date 
on which an accident occurred but re-
ferred only to February, 1977, and the 
applicant described the accident by stat-
ing: 'Under the stress of lifting steel 
daily I developed accute low back pain/ " 
However, at the hearing the plaintiff re-
counted an incident occurring in mid-De-
cember, in which he slipped while handling 
a piece of steel and struck his knee on the 
saw table. Although the blow was alleged-
ly very painful, the plaintiff testified, be-
cause he did not want to create a negative 
impression on his employer, he did not re-
port it. A short time later he hit the same 
knee on a piece of scrap metal protruding 
from a waste can and reported that incident 
to his supervisor. 
The plaintiff also stated generally the  \UK yum.v.*. — 
ery from the appendectomy the plaintiff above-mentioned problem with the han-
returned to work. By June of 1977, he was dling of the steel but could not identify a 
again experiencing significant pain in his specific instance as adversely affecting his 
eA(K;i ! i ; i ivatt£ « . & 
back. He was seen by three different medi-
cal doctors, these consultations culminated 
in a laminectomy and fusion of L5 SI level 
vertebrae on July 19, 1977. 
The plaintiffs application for workmen's 
compensation benefits was denied. Follow-
ing a hearing the administrative law judge 
entered findings of fact, conclusions of law 
and an order denying the benefits request-
ed. After the plaintiff's submission of a 
SpeCUlC i n s t a n t «^ v.
 v 
back. While the back pains the plaintiff 
complained of in February, 1977, allegedly 
originated contemporaneously with the slip-
ping incident the plaintiff introduced no 
direct proof he experienced or realized any 
specific damage to his back because of that 
incident. 
Section 35-1-45 provides compensation 
for industrial accidents when the employee: 
"is injured . . . by accident arising 
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out or or in the course of his employment, 
wheresoever such injury occurred, provided 
the same was not purposely self-inflicted." 
The administrative law judge concluded the 
plaintiff was not entitled to compensation, 
because he failed to establish he sustained 
an injury as a result of an identifiable 
accident or accidents. Quoting from Pintar 
v. Industrial Commission* the judge ex-
plained: 
"It is therefore, a prerequisite for com-
pensation that his disability be shown to 
result, not as a gradual development be-
cause of the nature or condition of his 
work, but from an identifiable accident or 
accidents in the course of the employ-
ment." 
[1] In this jurisdiction, it is settled be-
yond question an internal failure brought 
about by exertion in the course of employ-
ment may be an accident within the mean-
ing of 35-1-45, without the requirement 
that the injury result from some incident 
which happened suddenly and is identifiable 
at a definite time and place.2 As this Court 
explained in Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial 
Commission:3 
"In Cherdron Construction Co. v. Simp-
kins, 61 Utah 493, 214 P. 593, 596, this 
court held that '[t]he underlying principle 
seems to be that the injury must happen 
suddenly, undesigned and unexpected, 
and at a definite time and place.' In the 
Dee Hospital [v. Ind. Comm., 109 Utah 25, 
163 P.2d 331] case we have relaxed the 
requirement that it be sudden and at a 
definite time and place so that the essen-
tial requirement now seems to be that it 
be unexpected and not designed." 
1. Pintar v. Industrial Commission, 14 Utah 2d 
276,382 P.2d414 (1963). 
2. Jones v. California Packing Co.. 121 Utah 
612, 616, 244 P.2d 640, 642 (1952); see also 
Robertson v. Industrial Comm., 109 Utah 25, 
163 P.2d 331 (1945); Thomas D. Dee Memorial 
Hospital Assoc, v. Industrial Comm., 104 Utah 
61, 138 P.2d 233 (1943); Hammond v. Industri-
al Comm., 84 Utah 67, 34 P.2d 687 (1934). 
3. Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commission. 
115 Utah 1, 17, 201 P.2d 961. 969 (1949). 
[2, 3] It is equally well settled the injury 
received may be accidental even though the 
exertion* is that required in the ordinary 
course of employment.4 If an employee 
incurs unexpected injuries, including inter-
nal failures, caused by the ordinary duties 
of his employment he is eligible for compen-
sation under 35-1-45.5 Therefore, the ad-
ministrative law judges conclusion of law 
was erroneous and did not reflect our con-
temporary standard. 
[4] The existence of an unexpected inju-v 
ry, however, is the beginning rather than 
the end of the Commission's inquiry. This 
Court's interpretation of 35-1-45 requires 
the existence of a causal connection be-
tween the injury and the employment./ 
Justice Wade explained this requirement in 
Purity Biscuit:$ 
lt
. in a case of this kind where 
the employee suffers an internal bodily 
failure or breakdown the burden is on the 
applicant to show that the exertion was 
at least a contributing cause thereof. In 
other words, . . . in cases where 
disease or internal failure causes or is the 
injury there must be a causal connection 
between the employment and the injury." 
Many times the determination of the ex-
istence of a causal connection between the 
injury and the employment will depend on 
the production and interpretation of medi-
cal evidence. To establish agency expertise 
in this area the legislature enacted 35-1-77. 
This section provides: 
"Upon the filing of a claim for compen-
sation for injury by accident, or for 
death, arising out of or in the course of 
5. Justice Wolfe explained in his dissenting 
opinion in Robertson, supra note 2, 163 P.2d at 
338: "Thus where exertion or overexertion in 
the course of the employment causes disability 
or death, I agree that compensation should be 
allowed." 
6. Purity Biscuit, supra note 3, 201 P.2d at 969; 
see also M & K Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 112 
Utah 488, 189 P.2d 132 (1948); Robertson v. 
Industrial Comm., supra note 2; Andreason v. 
Industrial Comm.. 98 Utah 551. 100 P.2d 202 
(1940). 
4. Id., 201 P.2d at 969. 
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employment, and where the employer or 
insurance carrier denies liability, the com-
mission shall refer the medical aspects of 
the case to a medical panel . . ." 
[5] This statute mandates the submis-
sion of the medical aspects of the case to 
the medical panel.7 In the present case, as 
in most cases involving internal injury, the 
determination of the existence of the requi-
site causal connection depends in part on 
the accumulation and interpretation of 
medical evidence. The language of the 
statute is clear. When an accidental injury, 
such as in the present case, has occurred the 
submission of the medical aspects of the 
case, including those involving causation, is 
mandatory. 
At the hearing, the administrative law 
judge excluded certain evidence presented 
by the plaintiff because it was hearsay and 
thus inadmissible. Section 35-1-88 states: 
"Neither the commission nor its hear-
ing officers shall be bound by the usual 
common-law or statutory rules of evi-
. dence." 
[6, 7] The hearsay rule has no applica-
tion in a commission proceeding and the 
commission and its hearing officers may 
receive and consider any hearsay evidence 
presented to it.8 Therefore the administra-
tive law judge erred in excluding this evi-
dence on the basis of the hearsay rule. 
Because the present injury is of a type 
held by this Court to fall within the pur-
view of Section 35-1 45, the administrative 
law judge's conclusion that no accident oc-
curred should not be reached from the facts 
presented, without submission of the matter 
to the medical panel. The case is remanded 
to the Commission for further proceedings. 
Those proceedings shall include the submis-
7. Lipnum v. Industrial Comm., Utah, 592 P.2d 
GIG. 618 (1979). 
8. See Ogden Iron Works v. Industrial Comm., 
102 Utah 492. 132 P.2d 376 (1942). 
1. IB Larson at 7 4. citing inter alia. Residential 
& Commercial Construction Company v. Indus-
trial Commission. Utah, 529 P.2d 427 (1974). 
2. See. e. g.. Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949); 
sion of the medical aspects of this problem 
to a medical panel. 
WILKINS, Justice (concurring): 
I concur that this matter should be re-
manded and the medical aspects referred to 
a medical panel. Because, however, of con-
flicting case law in this State interpreting 
the statutory requirement that to support 
an award of compensation a worker must 
be injured "by accident," I deem it appro-
priate to enlarge on the analysis of this 
point found in the main opinion with a view 
to providing the Industrial Commission 
with a consistent standard to apply. 
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Jus-
tice Crockett centers on the necessity of 
identifying "an accident" which causes inju-
ry. As Professor Arthur Larson (hereafter 
"Larson") points out in his treatise, The 
Law of Workmen's Compensation (1980), 
"[t]he basic and indispensable ingredient of 
'accident' is unexpectedness".1 This Court 
has recognized as much in past cases.2 Lar-
son continues: 
A second ingredient, however, has been 
added in most jurisdictions: The injury 
must be traceable, within reasonable lim-
its, to a definite time, place, and occasion 
or cause. Justification of this widespread 
addition is not entirely clear. When the 
phrase "accidental injury" is used, or the 
equivalent phrase "injury by accident," 
there is no occasion, as a matter of gram-
mar, to read the phrase as if it referred 
"an accident," and then proceed to con-
duct a search for "the accident".3 (empha-
sis in original) 
The main opinion makes it clear that in 
Utah "accident" connotes an unlooked for 
mishap which is not expected or designed.4 
Residential & Commercial Construction Com-
pany v. Industrial Commission, supra. 
3. 1B Larson at 7 5. 
4. This is the language of the first English case 
interpreting the English workmen's compensa-
tion act which was adopted in 1897, Fvnton v. 
Ihorley & 0».. 11903) A.C. 443. Pcnton ha* 
often been cited in Utah cases including Purity 
Biscuit. 
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Mr. Chief Justice Crockett also expresses 
concern that without the requirement of 
identifying an accident in compensation 
cases, "[t]he practical effect would be to 
make the employer a general insurer of the 
health and well-being of his employees". 
In my view, protection against unwarranted 
awards for internal failure is not to be 
found in requiring identification of an acci-
dent. Rather protection against such 
awards is found in requiring a medically 
demonstrated causal connection between 
the injury and the employment. With the 
issue being one primarily of causation, the 
importance of the statutorily mandated 
medical panel becomes manifest. It is 
through the expertise of the medical panel 
that the Commission should be able to make 
the determination of whether the injury 
sustained by a claimant is causally connect-
ed or contributed to by the claimant's em-
ployment. 
There is no reason to expect that applica-
tion of the standards laid down in this case 
will render employers the insurers of the 
health of their employees. Rather there is 
every reason to expect that the beneficent 
and humanitarian purposes of the worker's 
compensation act will be effectuated. 
STEWART, J., concurs in result. 
CROCKETT, Chief Justice (dissenting): 
The foundational rules upon which this 
Court should review the Commission's rul-
ing are: that it is the Commission's prerog-
ative to judge the evidence, and if there is 
any reasonable basis therein to justify the 
Commission's finding, this Court should not 
disturb it.1 Conversely stated and specifi-
cally applicable here: when the Commission 
has refused to find a work-connected acci-
dent, this Court should not reverse and di-
rect such a finding unless the evidence is so 
clear and persuasive that all reasonable 
minds acting fairly thereon must necessari-
ly so find.2 
Bearing in mind those rules, the salient 
antr what should be the controlling proposi-
tion here is that the Commission was not 
persuaded that the plaintiff had met his 
burden of proving that he suffered an acci-
dent arising out of or in the course of his 
employment. 
The position taken in this dissent does not 
disagree with the proposition that even 
though an employee has a preexisting ab-
normal condition, if it is aggravated into a 
compensable injury or disability by an acci-
dent which arises out of or occurs in the 
course of his employment, as required by 
the statute, it is compensable. Nor do I 
question that if there is some extraordinary 
exertion or stress which produces an occur-
rence which the Commission finds to come 
within the definition of accident, it can be 
found compensable.3 
The point of disagreement with the main 
opinion is its statement that ". it is 
settled beyond question that an internal 
failure brought about by exertion in the 
course of employment may be an accident 
within the meaning of Sec. 35-1-45, with-
out the requirement that the injury result 
from some incident which happened sudden-
ly and is identifiable at a definite time and 
place." 
It is submitted that that statement is not 
justified by the cases cited in support there-
of; and I doubt that any such case can be 
found. On the contrary, the statement is 
squarely inconsistent with the applicable 
statute, and with all of the case law on the 
subject with which I am acquainted. 
The first place to test the soundness of 
the proposition just stated is the applicable 
statute. In my judgment, Sec. 35-1-45, 
U.C.A.1953, leaves no room for doubt or 
misunderstanding. It states plainly and 
simply that compensation is to be paid 
when the employee "is injured 
by accident arising out of or in the course 
of his employment." There similarly should 
be no misunderstanding or confusion on the 
proposition that the term "accident" im-
1. Kent v. lnd. Comm.. 89 Utah 381. 57 P.2d 724. 3. Graybar Electric Co. v. lnd. Comm., 73 Utah 
568, 276 P. 161. 
2, Id.; and see Vause v. lnd. Comm., 17 Utah 2d 
217, 407 P.2d 1006. 
fe 
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ports that there must be some unanticipat-
ed event or occurrence, different from what 
would normally be expected to occur in the 
usual course of events.4 It is submitted 
that a study of the numerous cases decided 
by this Court on the subject, and other 
authorities as well, will reveal that without 
exception, they have been concerned with 
whether there was in fact some incident or 
occurrence which would come within the 
definition of accident, as is expressly re-
quired by the statute.5 
Controversies of this character are so 
common that such cases are found in practi-
cally every volume of the Utah Reporter; 
and it would serve no useful purpose to 
burden this page with excessive citations. 
In the interest of brevity, it is sufficient to 
say that on the point of controversy herein, 
the cases are all of generally similar import. 
It seems fair to assume that the plaintiff 
(and the main opinion) would select those 
cases which would best give support for its 
thesis quoted above, and upon which its 
reversal of the Commission's order necessar-
ily must rest. 
The case of Robertson v. Ind. Comm.f on 
which the main opinion places reliance is as 
good an example as any. In that case, the 
burden of the main opinion was to demon-
strate that there was an extraordinary ex-
ertion in manipulating and skinning an ex-
tra large horse, so that the heart seizure 
would come within the definition of such an 
unexpected occurrence and thus could be 
found to be an accident. I join in the main 
opinion's approval of Justice Wolfe's rea-
soning and statement of the law in his 
dissent in that case. He stated the stan-
dard rule of review, which if applied to this 
case would affirm the Commission, that: 
"Unless the evidence is such as to compel 
the conclusion that the Commission was ar-
4. Tintic Milling Co. v. Ind. Comm., GO Utah 14, 
206 P. 278; Carlinp v. Ind. Conmi.. 10 Utah 2d 
260. 399 P.2d 202. 
5. Tintic Milling und Mining Co. v. Ind. Comm., 
60 Utah at 22. 206 P. at 2K1 states: 
If the injury is incurred uradually in the 
course of the employment, and because 
thereof, and there is no specific event or 
occurrence known as the starting point, it is 
bitrary in failing to find that the internal 
failure was service-connccted, we should 
not set aside its decision/'7 And upon the 
basis of his previously made explanation 
that it was the prerogative of the Commis-
sion to find the facts, he dissented from the 
reversal of the Commission's decision. 
Another good example of the principle 
involved is our recent case of IGA Food 
Fair v. Martin} There, the applicant was 
undergoing unusual exertion in unloading a 
shipment of heavy boxes of meat and, be-
cause of the extraordinary stress, suffered a 
heart attack. The same comment is to be 
made about Jones v, Ind. Comm.* in which 
the extraordinary stress was from being 
required to repeatedly crank a balky motor 
over a long 16-hour double shift. 
It is important to realize that the removal 
of the requirement that there be some 
event which can be regarded as an accident 
arising out of or occurring in the course of 
employment, so that it need only appear 
that some injury or disability developed 
which could be related to the employee's 
work, would be a dramatic change in our 
law. The practical effect would be to make 
the employer a general insurer of that as-
pect of the health and well-being of his 
employees. This might be of temporary 
benefit to a few individuals in the labor 
force who may have some infirmity. But I 
think if we take a second look, such a rule 
would do them more harm than good in the 
long run. 
The forcing of employers to become, in 
practical effect, such general insurers of 
employees would add to the already plenti-
ful burdens of going into or carrying on 
enterprises, which furnish jobs for others, 
and would thus reduce opportunities for 
employment. More especially, with respect 
held to be an occupational disease, and not 
an injury resulting from accident. 
6. 109 Utah 25. 163 P.2d 331. 
7. Id. at 47. 163 P.2d at 341. 
8. Utah, 584 P.2d 828. 
9. 121 Utah 612. 244 P.2d 640. 
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to persons who already have some infirmity, 
there would be even more adverse effect 
because economic necessity would force em-
ployers to give more searching examina-
tions, and refuse to hire anyone with any 
history or indication of physical disability or 
handicap. I acknowledge that the proposi-
tion just stated should be considered by this 
Court only if it thinks it has the prerogative 
of making a dramatic change in policy and 
the law. It is my view that the Court has 
no such prerogative; and that the proper 
procedure for the long term benefit of em-
ployers, employees and the public generally 
is to follow the statute as it is written, and 
the adjudications thereon; and if there is to 
be any such dramatic change in the law, it 
should be done by the legislature. Then, 
everyone will know of that change in the 
law, when it takes effect, and how to gov-
ern themselves in accord therewith. 
There is no question here, but that the 
plaintiff suffered from a pre-existing diffi-
culty with his back, for which he had previ-
ously, received medical treatment and which 
had existed at least since he was in junior 
high school, eight or nine years prior to this 
claim. As the main opinion itself fairly and 
properly points out, the plaintiff himself 
stated unequivocally that he could not iden-
tify any specific time or occurrence in his 
work as the origin of the disability in his 
back. 
In response to various questions concern-
ing whether there was any incident or oc-
currence from which the applicant's back 
problem resulted, he repeatedly stated that 
there was not. Typical of these answers is: 
Q. Mr. Schmidt, isn't it true that you 
really cannot relate the onset on your 
back pain to any particular event 
that occurred while you were work-
ing for Kenway? 
A. That's true. (R., p. 37) 
On the basis of the whole evidence, the 
findings of the administrative law judge, 
adopted by the Commission, states: 
that the applicant has simply 
not met his burden of proving that an 
accident occurred which caused the injury 
complained of. We further note that 
COMMISSION OF UTAH Utah 699 
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there are no witnesses, no timely report-
ing and no showing of a relationship be-
tween the injury and the work of the 
applicant. 
In regard to the question of reference to 
a medical panel: Plaintiff cites Sec. 35-1-
77, which requires the Commission to refer 
"the medical aspects of the case to a medi-
cal panel .." As is true of all stat-
utes, this one should be given a sensible and 
practical application. First, assume a hypo-
thetical case in which the evidence was so 
absolutely clear that no one could disagree 
that the applicant had suffered no accident 
in the course of his employment. Would it 
yet be maintained that merely because he 
had filed an application for benefits and the 
employer had denied liability, the Commis-
sion was nevertheless compelled to refer the 
case to a medical panel. It seems idle to 
have to answer such a question, but the 
answer, of course, is no. The same reason-
ing applies here. Inasmuch as the findings 
and order of the Commission rest upon the 
proposition that considering the whole evi-
dence, and particularly the plaintiffs own 
testimony, there was no basis upon which to 
find that there was a work-caused or con-
nected accident, there would be no useful 
purpose to be served by referring the non-
existent medical aspects of the case to a 
medical panel. 
Because there is no basis upon which it 
can be concluded that the action of the 
Commission was capricious, arbitrary or un-
reasonable, I would affirm its decision. 
HALL, Justice (dissenting): 
I join in the dissent of Mr. Chief Justice 
Crockett which I deem reflects the accurate 
state of the law in Utah. Particularly is 
this so in light of the most recent pro-
nouncement of this Court in Farmers Grain 
v. Mason, Utah, 606 P.2d 237 (1980). 
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that the court should have granted a mis-
trial? 
[1-4] In the first place it appears that 
the matter was not properly and timely 
brought to the attention of the trial court. 
The objection made was that it called for a 
legal conclusion. Then defendant's counsel 
suggested that Mr. Whiteley be handed a 
copy of the decision. After the matter had 
been thoroughly discussed, counsel for de-
fendant then indicated a desire to make a 
motion out of the presence of the jury. The 
court suggested that he make it at recess 
and he agreed to do so. 
During the next recess defense counsel 
did move for a mistrial and during the 
argument following the motion he stated: 
MR. LIVINGSTON: Your Honor, 
maybe so that we could work this out I 
would be amenable if the Court rather 
than ruling on the motion for a mistrial, 
if the Court would give a Jury instruction 
to the effect that that was a misstate-
ment of law as to whether Mr. Whiteley 
was convicted of fraud, and that that is 
not relevant in this case and not to be 
considered in this case by the Jury in 
their deliberations as to what the agree-
ment was between the parties and who is 
going to pay for the attorney's fees. 
The court denied the motion for a mis-
trial and gave the following instruction to 
the jury: 
Any evidence or inference which may 
have been made in this courtroom that 
Mr. Whiteley was named personally in 
the case of Robcrston v. Gcis, et al, is 
incorrect as Mr. Whiteley was not a party 
to that lawsuit and you should disregard 
any such inferences or evidence. 
The granting of a motion for a mistrial 
lies in the sound discretion of the trial 
judge and his ruling should be overturned 
only when it clearly appears that he has 
abused his discretion. A mistrial should be 
2. Curley v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corpora-
tion, 314 Mass. 31, 49 N.F..2U 445 (1943). 
3. Goodwin v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 
196 Wash. 391, 83 P.2d 231 (1938); Musser v. 
Murphy, 49 Idaho 141, 286 P. 618 (1930). 
granted only when it appears that justice 
will be thwarted unless the jury is dis-
charged and a new trial granted.2 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in refusing to grant a mistrial under the 
circumstances of this case. 
[5, 6] However, the court in calculating 
the amount of the judgment, compounded 
the interest annually on the unpaid 
amounts due. This is not proper. Com-
pound interest is not favored by the law.3 
The plaintiff relies upon the case of Jen-
sen v. Lichtenstcin* as authority for per-
mitting compound interest. That case is 
not in point. There the defendant promised 
to pay interest at specified times and this 
Court held that when the specified date 
arrived there was a new debt, to wit, the 
promised interest, in addition to the original 
debt. In the instant matter there was no 
promise to pay interest at a particular time. 
The judgment is affirmed except as to 
the interest and as to that matter the case 
is remanded to the trial court with di-
rections to recalculate the interest at simple 
interest rate. 
L. Virginia LIPMAN, widow of Paul 
Lipman, Deceased, Plaintiff, 
v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Utah, 
Utah State Prison, and State 
Insurance Fund, Defendants. 
No. 15821. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 12, 1979. 
Workmen's compensation benefits were 
denied by the Industrial Commission, and 
4. 45 Utah 320, 145 P. 1036 (1915). 
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claimant sought review. The Supreme 
Court, Hall, J., held that: (1) Commission's 
refusal to refer to medical panel question 
whether death from myocardial infarction 
was causally related to circumstances occur-
ring on job was prejudicial and required 
reversal, and (2) Commission erred in stat-
ing that applicant had burden of proving 
causal relationship by clear and convincing 
evidence; proper standard was usual stan-
dard of proof used in most civil actions. 
Order of Commission vacated and set 
aside, and matter remanded. 
1. Workers* Compensation c=» 1730 
When liability is denied, applicant for 
workmen's compensation has clear right to 
have case referred to medical panel ap-
pointed by Industrial Commission, and stat-
ute so providing is mandatory. U.C.A.1953, 
£5-1-77. 
2. Workers* Compensation o=»1730, 1937 
Industrial Commission's refusal to refer 
to medical panel question whether death 
from myocardial infarction was causally re-
lated to circumstances occurring on job was 
prejudicial and required reversal. U.C.A. 
1953, 35-1-77. 
3. Workers' Compensation o=»1413 
Industrial Commission erred in stating 
that applicant for workmen's compensation 
had burden of proving causal relationship 
by clear and convincing evidence; proper 
standard was usual standard of proof used 
in most civil actions. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45, 
35-1-77, 35-1-83. 
Scott W. Cameron, of Backman, Clark & 
Marsh, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. 
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Robert D. 
Moore, Salt Lake City, for defendant. 
HALL, Justice: 
Paul Lipman, husband of petitioner, died 
May 23, 1977, as a result of an acute myo-
1. U.C.A., 1953, 35 1 45. 
2. U.C.A., 1953, 35-1-83. 
UAL COMMISSION Utah 617 
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cardial infarction while on duty as the con-
trol room sergeant at the Utah State Pris-
on. The Industrial Commission denied ben-
efits to the petitioner because it found that 
her husband did not die as a result of an 
accident arising out of or in the course of 
his employment.1 This matter was then 
brought before this Court for review.2 
The evidence before the Commission 
showed that the deceased had suffered one 
(and possibly two) heart attacks prior to his 
death. He suffered from an arteriosclerotic 
heart condition and had undergone correc-
tive surgery the previous autumn for a per-
foral heart condition. In November 1976 he 
suffered an almost fatal episode of pulmo-
nary edema while on vacation. As a result 
of his condition he was permitted to work 
only part time until approximately two 
months before his death. He was diabetic 
and had been a lifelong smoker of tobacco. 
His treating physician testified that a per-
son with the medical and social history of 
the deceased had a high probability of being 
subject to a myocardial infarction and that 
this probability was not conditioned upon 
any unusual stress or exertion. 
The petitioner claims that decedent's 
death was caused by the extra work and 
stress brought on by the "escape" of a 
female inmate. The woman was housed at 
the Y.W.C.A. in Salt Lake City which func-
tioned as a half-way house for the prison 
where low-risk inmates were given certain 
community privileges as a step toward ulti-
mate release. The woman was discovered 
to be missing at 11:55 p. m. on May 22, 
1977, which has reported to one Connie 
Buck, a supervisory counselor at the facili-
ty, some 25 minutes later. Ms. Buck con-
tacted Mr. Lipman at the prison and the 
Y.W.C.A. director, whereupon the inmate 
was designated an escapee. Mr. Lipman 
was responsible for coordinating all infor-
mation regarding the escape. He learned 
of the escape at about 12:40 a. m. on May 
23, 1977,3 and until his death, some two 
3. The testimony is conflicting as to precisely 
when the escape occurred. The Commission's 
finding that the escape occurred at 11:55 a. m. 
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hours later, he had more phone calls than he 
otherwise would have handled. 
We do not reach the ultimate issue as to 
whether or not the death was job related 
because the resolution of two procedural 
points raised by petitioner are dispositive of 
this review. The two points are: (1) that 
the Commission refused to refer this matter 
to a medical panel as provided by law, and 
(2) that the Commission applied an improp-
er standard as to the burden of persuasion. 
[1] When liability is denied, an appli-
cant for Workmen's Compensation is af-
forded a clear right to have the case re-
ferred to a medical penal appointed by the. 
Commission. The applicable statute reads 
in pertinent part as follows: 
Upon the filing of a claim for compen-
sation for injury by accident, or for 
death, arising out of or in the course of 
employment, and where the employer or 
insurance carrier denies liability, the com-
mission shall refer the medical aspects of 
the case to a medical panel appointed by 
the commission The medical 
panel shall make such study, take such 
X-rays and perform such tests, including 
post mortem examinations where autho-
rized by the commission, as it may deter-
mine and thereafter shall make a report 
in writing to the commission . ,4 
The foregoing statute is clearly mandato-
ry and requires that a medical panel "shall" 
be convened "upon the filing of a claim for 
compensation for injury by accident, or for 
death, arising out of or in the course of 
employment/' when the employer or insur-
ance carrier denies liability. 
[2] In difficult or doubtful cases, the 
findings of a medical panel may assist in 
determining whether the death was caused 
by accident. In this case, it is known that 
(some twelve hours before Lipmnn learned of 
it) appears to be erroneous. 
4. U.C.A., 1953, 35-1-77. 
5. M & K Corporation v. Industrial Comm., 112 
Utah 488, 189 P.2c! 132 (1918). 
6. Grasteit v. Industrial Commission, 76 Utah 
487, 2Q0 P. 764 (1930); Higley v. Industrial 
Commission, 75 Utah 361, 285 P. 306 (1930); 
death was caused by a myocardial infarc-
tion, but the ultimate question is whether 
or not it can be said that the myocardial 
infarction was causally related to circum-
stances occurring on the job.5 
Findings of a medical panel may well be 
important in assisting the Commission to 
determine whether job-caused stress in-
duced injury or death in such a manner as 
to be compensable. The petitioner in this 
case should not be deprived of an important 
procedural provision in the Workmen's 
Compensation Act. This is particularly so 
here since petitioner's procedural rights are 
closely akin to her substantive rights. 
[3] Turning now to the issue raised as to 
the quantum of evidence necessary to prove 
compensability, the Commission slated that 
the petitioner had the burden of proving by 
clear and convincing evidence that the 
death of the deceased was caused by tension 
and stress of his employment. This Court 
has consistently held that the burden of 
proof in Workmen's Compensation cases is 
proof by a preponderance of the evidence.6 
It appears that the only Utah case which 
makes reference to any other standard of 
proof is Thomas D. Dec Memorial r. Indus-
trial Commission,1 and that reference was 
clearly dictum. The standard of "clear and 
convincing" evidence has not been adopted 
by this Court. To adopt such a standard in 
a case of this nature would make recovery 
for death caused by internal failure excep-
tionally difficult especially where the de-
ceased had a pre-existing condition that 
may have contributed to the death. Appli-
cation of the usual standard of proof which 
is used in most civil actions better accom-
modates the liberal purposes of the act and 
the type of proof that is likely to be availa-
ble in most cases of this type.8 Utilization 
Henderson v. Industrial Commission, 80 Utah 
316, 15 P.2d 302 (1932); Wilson v. Industrial 
Commission, 99 Utah 524, 108 P.2d 519 (1940). 
of tha 
case, « 
referr 
plaint 
in the 
The 
and si 
for fu 
opinio 
CRC 
WILK 
Sandr 
7. 104 Utah 61. 138 P.2d 233 (1943). 
8. See Askren v. Industrial Commission, 
Utah 2d 275, 391 P.2d 302 (1964). 
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of that standard by the Commission in this 
case, combined with the refusal to make a 
referral to a medical panel, denied the 
plaintiffs right to have the claim evaluated 
in the manner contemplated by the statute. 
The order of the Commission is vacated 
and set aside and the matter is remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. Costs awarded to petitioner. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN, 
WILKINS and STEWART, JJ. t concur. 
Sandra D. FUNK and Robert A. Young, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
;•••• . v . 
William R. YOUNG, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 15937. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 12, 1979. 
YOUNG Utah 619 
P.2d6l9 
and are in possession of real property to 
bring action for sale in lieu of partition, sole 
life tenant, by himself, does not have right 
to force sale in lieu of partition. U.C.A. 
1953, 78-39-1. 
2. Partition O=>19 
One vested remainderman cannot com-
pel sale in lieu of partition under statute 
permitting one or more of several cotenants 
who hold interest in and are in possession of 
real property to bring action for sale in lieu 
of partition, where there is no possessory 
interest in the vested remainderman. U.C. 
A.1953, 78 39 1. 
3. Partition c=*M, 19 
Petition of life tenant and one vested 
remainderman failed to state claim under 
statute permitting one or more of several 
cotenants who hold interest in and are in 
possession of real property to bring action 
for sale in lieu of partition, where the life 
tenant was sole life tenant and remainder-
man was not in possession. U.C.A.1953, 
78-39-1. 
David Lloyd of Watkins & Fairer, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants. 
Franklin D. Anderson, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and respondent. 
Life tenant and vested remainderman 
appealed from order of the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, David K. Winder, 
J., dismissing petition for sale in lieu of 
partition. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., 
held that petition failed to state claim un-
der statute permitting one or more of sev-
eral cotenants who hold interest in and are 
in possession of real property to bring ac-
tion for sale in lieu of partition, where the 
life tenant was sole life tenant and remain-
derman was not in possession. 
Affirmed. 
1. Partition c=>14 
Under statute permitting one or more 
of several cotenants who hold interest in 
STEWART, Justice: 
The parties in this case are two brothers 
and a sister who inherited a house from 
their mother. Robert A. Young, a plaintiff, 
inherited a life estate interest in the house 
subject to his personally residing there and 
subject to an obligation to repair and main-
tain the premises and to pay the utilities, 
taxes and special assessments. The other 
plaintiff, Sandra D. Funk, and the defend-
ant, William R. Young, were devised the 
remainder fee estate as co-tenants. Sandra 
D. Funk and Robert A. Young brought an 
action in the District Court seeking an or-
der directing the sale of the property and 
an apportionment of the proceeds under our 
partition statute, Section 78-39-1, U.C.A.1 
The District Court dismissed the action for 
I. U.C.A. refers to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
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ment of Employment Security ("depart-
ment'*) for unemployment benefits. The 
department found that plaintiff was enti-
tled to weekly benefits for a period of ten 
weeks, but reduced his benefits by 100% of 
the amounts which he was then receiving as 
retirement benefits, pursuant to U.C.A., 
1953, § 35-4-3(b). This reduced plaintiffs 
unemployment benefits to zero. 
Plaintiff began receiving payments from 
the Federal Civil Service Retirement Sys-
tem on or about January 27, 1980. The 
payments received by plaintiff from said 
Retirement System are not subject to feder-
al income tax to the extent they are con-
sidered a return of plaintiffs contribution 
to his retirement fund, under applicable 
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. 
At the department, plaintiff submitted 
proof that his receipts from the Civil Ser-
vice Retirement System would not be taxa-
ble until July 15, 1981. U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 35-4-3(b) provides, in part: 
[T]he "weekly benefit amount" of an in-
dividual who is receiving, or who is eligi-
ble to receive, retirement benefits by rea-
son of his past performance of personal 
services shall be the "weekly benefit 
amount" which is computed pursuant to 
this section less 50% until April 1,1980, at 
which time the deduction for retirement 
income shall be 100% (disregarding any 
fraction of $1) of his primary benefits 
which are attributable to a week. 
In seeking a reversal of the decision of 
the department, plaintiff argues that his 
retirement benefits did not begin until July 
15, 1981, and that until that time, plaintiff 
received only a return of his capital, which 
was neither "wages" nor new income. 
On this basis, he contends that until July 
15, 1981, he received only those amounts 
which he had been forced to save. He 
points out that other savings accounts are 
not deductible from unemployment bene-
fits, and the statute requiring reduction of 
his unemployment benefits by the amounts 
received monthly from these savings, while 
disregarding other savings, constitutes dis-
crimination and a denial of equal protection 
in violation of the Utah and U.S. Constitu-
tions. 
This Court has previously considered 
plaintiffs arguments and has found them 
to be without merit. Coleman v. Depart-
ment of Employment Security, 29 Utah 2d 
326, 509 P.2d 355 (1973). Unemployment 
compensation is designed to alleviate hard-
ship to an employee and his family due to 
involuntary layoffs where the employee has 
no other means of meeting his expenses of 
living. In the same manner, retirement 
benefits enable the employee to meet these 
expenses. 
Plaintiffs argument that his receipts are 
not income or wages is not persuasive. The 
statute does not speak in terms of wage or 
income receipts; rather, "retirement bene-
fits" which are "received by reason of his 
past performance of personal services" are 
deductible under Section 35-4-3(b). The 
monthly payments payable to plaintiff from 
the Civil Service Retirement System meet 
this description, and are thus deductible 
from unemployment compensation under 
our statute. 
State 
Affirmed. 
( o I KEYNUM8ERSYSTEM> 
The STATE of Utah, DEPARTMENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
Roger C. HIGGS, Kurt Mathia, and 
George C. Melis, Defendants and 
Respondents. 
No. 17607. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 26, 1982. 
Appeal was taken from order of the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Kenneth Rigtrup, J., which dismissed 
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State's petition for review of Step 5 griev-
ance ruling. The Supreme Court, Stewart, 
J., held that: (1) where Personnel Manage-
ment Act which removed right of State to 
seek judicial review of Step 5 proceeding 
had been adopted while the grievance was 
pending, District Court did not have juris-
diction, but (2) order dismissing should al-
low State to pursue its new right to a Step 
6 proceeding. 
Affirmed as modified. 
1. Statutes «=» 267(2) 
Procedural statutes enacted subsequent 
to the initiation of a suit which do not 
enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or con-
tractual rights apply not only to future 
actions but also to accrued and pending 
actions as well; new procedural rules do not 
affect proceedings completed prior to enact-
ment. 
2. Statutes <s=>270 
When the purpose of an amendment is 
to clarify the meaning of an earlier enact-
ment, the amendment may be applied retro-
actively in pending actions. 
3. Labor Relations s=>477 
Where statute providing State with a 
right to judicial review of grievance pro-
ceeding after a Step 5 determination was 
repealed prior to completion of those proce-
dures, State's complaint in the district court 
did not validly invoke the jurisdiction of the 
district court. 
4. Administrative Law and Procedure 
^ 2 2 9 
Administrative remedies must first be 
exhausted before resort may be had to judi-
cial review. 
5. Courts <s=>23 
Parties may not by stipulation enlarge 
the jurisdiction of a court beyond the 
boundaries delimited by statutory or consti-
tutional law. 
6. Labor Relations <s=M12 
Personnel Management Act did not af-
fect any common-law or vested rights of 
State or employee who had filed grievance 
AL SERVICES v. HIGGS Utah 999 
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and would be applied in case which was 
pending in the grievance procedure at the 
time of the adoption of the Act. U.C.A. 
1953, 67-19-20 to 67-19-25. 
7. Labor Relations <s=>486 
Where State had improperly attempted 
to obtain judicial review of Step 5 griev-
ance ruling even though the Personnel 
Management Act had been adopted which 
created a Step 6 procedure for the State to 
use, order dismissing State's petition for 
review in the court would allow for State to 
file a Step 6 proceeding. 
Don R. Petersen, Provo, for plaintiff and 
appellant. 
Kathryn Collard, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendants and respondents. 
STEWART, Justice: 
The State of Utah, on behalf of the De-
partment of Social Services, filed a com-
plaint in the district court June 7, 1980, 
seeking judicial review of an administrative 
order sustaining in part employee griev-
ances filed by the defendants against the 
Department. On July 22, 1980, the district 
court dismissed the complaint because the 
State had failed to exhaust its administra-
tive remedies. The State appeals that or-
der, contending that the trial court erred in 
not applying the procedural provisions of 
the statute in effect at the time defendants 
first initiated their grievance procedures 
rather than different procedural provisions 
enacted subsequent to the initiation of the 
administrative proceedings. 
The Department's objection to various 
conduct by the defendants led to the de-
fendants' initiation of employee grievance 
proceedings under the State Employees' 
Grievance Procedure Act, U.C.A., 1953, 
§§ 67-17-1 to -6 (repealed by 1979 Utah 
Laws, ch. 139, § 36). That Act provided 
state employees with a five-step grievance 
procedure which consisted of: (1) an oral 
discussion with the grievant's immediate su-
pervisor; (2) a written appeal to the griev-
ant's immediate supervisor; (3) a written 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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appeal to the grievant's second level super-
visor; (4) a written appeal to and hearing 
before the grievant's department head; and 
(5) a written appeal to and hearing before a 
state hearing officer. The Act authorized 
judicial review of the administrative deci-
sion by the district court upon petition by 
either the employee or the State at the 
conclusion of the Step 5 procedure. § 67-
17-6(5). 
After the first four steps had been com-
pleted and a Step 5 hearing had been sched-
uled but not yet held, the Grievance Proce-
dure Act was repealed, 1979 Utah Laws, ch. 
139, § 36, and replaced by the Utah State 
Personnel Management Act, U.C.A., 1953, 
§§ 67-19-20 to -25 (1981 Supp.), which es-
tablished a sixth level of administrative re-
view before a personnel review board. Un-
der the Personnel Management Act as orig-
inally enacted, only an employee, not the 
State, was accorded the right to appeal to 
the personnel review board from the Step 5 
proceeding; either the employee or the 
state agency could seek judicial review of 
the new Step 6 proceeding. 1979 Utah 
Laws, ch. 139, § 31. 
Upon completion of the Step 5 procedure 
in this case, the hearing officer denied four 
and sustained five of the nine employee 
grievances. The Department sought judi-
cial review of that decision in the district 
court pursuant to the repealed Grievance 
Procedure Act, which was in effect at the 
commencement of the administrative pro-
ceedings. At the same time, the employees 
petitioned for a Step 6 administrative re-
view pursuant to § 67-19-25(6) of the new 
Personnel Management Act on those issues 
on which they had lost. 
The district court, on the employees' mo-
tion to dismiss, ruled that the State had not 
exhausted its remedies and that no substan-
tive right of the Department would be prej-
udiced by completion of the administrative 
process. The court therefore remanded the 
matter for further administrative proceed-
ings, and the State filed an appeal from 
that order to this Court. While the appeal 
was pending, but before the case was 
briefed and argued, the Legislature again 
changed the grievance procedures, amend-
ing the Personnel Management Act to allow 
either the agency or aggrieved employees to 
obtain a Step 6 review, and to allow judicial 
review of a Step 6 order only to the ag-
grieved employee and not to the state agen-
cy. 
The central issue in this case is what law 
governs the procedural rights of the par-
ties: the Grievance Procedure Act which 
was in effect at the commencement of the 
action; the Personnel Management Act 
which was enacted after the action was 
commenced but before the petition for judi-
cial review was filed; or the amendment to 
that act which was passed while the case,/ 
was pending before this Court. 
The State argues that the law in effect at 
the time the legal proceedings are initiated 
controls all the proceedings from that point 
forward. It relies for that proposition on 
Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Trustees, Inc., 
8 Utah 2d 101, 329 P.2d 398 (1958); McCar-
rey v. Utah State Teachers' Retirement Bd.t 
111 Utah 251, 177 P.2d 725 (1947); and In 
re Ingraham's Estate, 106 Utah 337, 148 
P.2d 340 (1944). These authorities state the 
well-established rule that statutory enact-
ments which affect substantive or vested 
rights generally operate only prospectively. 
Under the cases cited, the substantive law 
to be applied throughout an action is the 
law in effect at the date the action was 
initiated. State v. Carney, 163 Ohio St. 159, 
126 N.E.2d 449 (1955). Since the State had 
the right of judicial review upon completion 
of Step 5 under the law in effect at the 
initiation of the administrative proceedings, 
the State asserts that it may not be de-
prived of that right by a subsequent change 
in the law. 
[1,2] However, procedural statutes en-
acted subsequent to the initiation of a suit 
which do not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy 
vested or contractual rights apply not only 
to future actions, but also to accrued and 
pending actions as well. Petty v. Clark, 113 
Utah 205, 192 P.2d 589 (1948); Boucofski v. 
Jacobscn, 36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117 (1909); 82 
C.J.S., Statutes, § 416 (1953). Generally, 
new procedural rules do not affect proceed-
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ings completed prior to enactment. Drain-
age District No. 7 of Washington County v. 
Bernards, 89 Or. 531, 174 P. 1167 (1918). 
Further proceedings in a pending case are 
governed by the new law. St. Louis South-
western Railway Co. v. Robinson, 228 Ark. 
418, 308 S.W.2d 282 (1957); Cleveland Trust 
-Co. v. Eaton, 21 Ohio St.2d 129, 256 N.E.2d 
198 (1970); Drainage District No. 7 of 
Washington County v. Bernards, supra. 
^However, when the purpose of an amend-
ment is to clarify the meaning of an earlier 
enactment, the amendment may be applied 
y retroactively in pending actions. McGuirc 
v. University of Utah Medical Center, Utah, 
' 603 P.2d 786 (1979); Foil v. Ballingcr, Utah, 
601 P.2d 144 (1979); Okland Construction 
Co. v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 520 
\ P.2d 208 (1974). 
The State contends that Archer v. Utah 
State Land Board, 15 Utah 2d 321, 392 P.2d 
622 (1964), is squarely on point and controls 
this case. In Archer the Court held that 
once jurisdiction of the district court had 
attached in a proceeding for review of an 
administrative order, an amendment pro-
viding for additional administrative pro-
ceedings prior to judicial- review did not 
divest the court of jurisdiction. The origi-
nal law continued to govern and the amend-
ment had no effect. In Archer the Court 
did not distinguish between substantive law 
changes and procedural law changes. In 
any event, a vital factual distinction exists 
between ArcAer and the present case. Al-
though we stated in Archer "that ordinarily 
the facts and the law in a given lawsuit are 
to be applied as of the date of the filing of 
the original complaint," 15 Utah 2d at 324, 
392 P.2d at 624, the effective date of the 
amendment in that case was after the filing 
of the complaint in the district court. In 
the instant case, the law providing for judi-
cial review after Step 5 was repealed prior 
to the filing of the complaint. 
Industrial Commission v. Agcc, 56 Utah 
63, 189 P. 414 (1920), also held that once a 
reviewing court's jurisdiction had attached 
in a case, an act repealing the jurisdiction 
of the court in question was not intended to 
divest that court of jurisdiction. In Agce 
an appeal was taken to the district court for 
judicial review of an Industrial Commission 
order. The district court's affirmance of 
the Commission's order was reversed on ap-
peal to this Court and remanded to the 
district court. The defendants moved to 
dismiss, asserting that the district court 
lacked jurisdiction because of an amend-
ment, which became effective prior to the 
remand, transferring jurisdiction for judi-
cial review of Commission orders from the 
district court to the Supreme Court. The 
district court denied the motion to dismiss, 
holding that the change in the law had not 
deprived it of jurisdiction. The defendants 
appealed to this Court, and we affirmed the 
district court's exercise of jurisdiction, and 
held that the former law governed the 
pending dispute on the ground that the 
Legislature had not intended to disrupt the 
appeal proceedings then in process in the 
courts and thereby leave some employees 
with no right of judicial review. 
[3,4] In the instant case, the statute 
providing the Department with a right to 
judicial review of a Step 5 determination 
was repealed prior to the completion of 
Step 5 procedures. The complaint filed in 
the district court did not validly invoke the 
jurisdiction of the district court because 
there was no then existing statute authoriz-
ing the exercise of such jurisdiction. 
Therefore, Archer and Agee are not disposi-
tive. The statute in effect when the State 
filed its complaint in the district court re-
quired defendants to complete ail available 
administrative procedures prior to filing a 
petition for judicial review in the district 
court, and this the State failed to do. It is 
elementary that administrative remedies, 
except in rare instances, must first be ex-
hausted before resort may be had to judicial 
review. Johnson v. Utah State Retirement 
Bd., Utah, 621 P.2d 1234 (1980); Am.Jur.2d, 
Administrative Law § 595 (1962). Thus, 
under the law in effect at the time of filing 
the complaint, the Personnel Management 
Act, the district court correctly held that 
the administrative procedures had not been 
exhausted and properly dismissed the com-
plaint. 
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The additional administrative proceedings 
provided for by the Personnel Management 
Act, § 67-19-1 et seq., must be completed 
in accordance with the terms of that act 
before any right of judicial review accrues. 
As stated in Boucofski v. Jacobsen, 36 Utah 
165, 104 P. 117 (1909): 
While it is true that a party's rights in a 
judgment, as a general rule, may not be 
affected by legislative acts passed or 
which become effective after the entry of 
judgment, the rule does not apply to laws 
which are merely remedial, and which 
only affect matters of procedure or prac-
tice . . . . [T]he amendment related to a 
matter of procedure merely, and this 
would apply to all pending actions unless 
limited to future actions. In 1 Lewis' 
Suth. Stat. Const. § 674, the author says: 
"Where a new statute deals with proce-
dure only, prima facie, it applies to all 
actions—those which have accrued or are 
pending, and to future actions." Further 
on in the same section it is said: "A 
remedy may be provided for existing 
rights, a new remedy added to or substi-
tuted for those which exist. Every case 
must, to a considerable extent, depend on 
its own circumstances. General words in 
remedial statutes may be applied to past 
transactions and pending cases, according 
to all indications of legislative intent, and 
this may be greatly influenced by consid-
erations of convenience, reasonableness 
and justice." In section 686 of the same 
volume it is said: "Statutes enacted to 
promote and facilitate the administration 
of justice are prominent in the category 
of remedial statutes." Section 3490, 
Comp.Laws 1907, provides: uAn action is 
deemed to be pending from the time of 
its commencement until its final determi-
nation upon appeal, or until the time for 
appeal has passed, unless the judgment is 
sooner satisfied." 
Id. at 171-72, 104 P. at 119-20. See also 
United States v. National City Lines, 80 
F.Supp. 734 (S.D.Cal.1948); Tennessee Riv-
er Nav. Co. v. Grantland, 199 Ala. 674, 75 
So. 283 (1917); Boyda Dairy Co. v. Conti-
nental Casualty Co., 299 Ill.App. 469, 20 
N.E.2d 339 (1939). 
Section 67-19-25 of the Personnel Man-
agement Act now provides that both a state 
agency and an aggrieved employee may 
take a Step 6 appeal to the personnel re-
view board from an adverse decision at 
Step 5. The agency's right of judicial re-
view under the old Grievance Procedure 
Act and under the Personnel Management 
Act prior to its amendment, however, is 
abolished. 
[5] Finally, we note the State's conten-
tion that the parties had stipulated prior to 
the Step 5 proceeding that the Grievance 
Procedure Act would govern the proceed-
ings in this case. The stipulation, however, 
is not effective to confer jurisdiction on a 
court. Parties may not by stipulation en-
large the jurisdiction of a court beyond the 
boundaries delimited by statutory or consti-
tutional law. Landes & Co. v. Fellows, 81 
Utah 432, 19 P.2d 389 (1933); Winn v. 
Winn, Mont., 651 P.2d 51 (1982); Sholty v. 
Carruih, 126 Ariz. 458, 616 P.2d 918 (1980). 
[6] On remand of this case, the Person-
nel Management Act will control the ad-
ministrative proceeding since it does not 
affect any common law or vested rights, 
and since jurisdiction of the district court 
had not yet attached at the time the Em-
ployees' Grievance Procedure Act was re-
pealed. Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 90 S.Ct 
200, 24 L.Ed.2d 214 (1969); Thorpe v. Hous-
ing Authority, 393 U.S. 268, 89 S.Ct. 518, 21 
L.Ed.2d 474 (1969); Carpenter v. Wabash 
Railway Co., 309 U.S. 23, 60 S.Ct. 416, 84 
L.Ed. 558 (1940); Concerned Parents v. 
Mitchell, Utah, 645 P.2d 629 (1982). 
[7] Because of the unusual procedural 
complications in this case, we think it ap-
propriate that the Department of Social 
Services be accorded on remand the right of 
filing for a Step 6 proceeding, and the order 
of the district court remanding this case 
should be amended to so provide. 
Affirmed as modified. 
HALL, C.J., and OAKS, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
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MARSHALL v. 
Nolan W. MARSHALL, Plaintiff, 
v. 
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF the 
STATE OF UTAH, Emery Mining Cor-
poration (Employer), and/or the State 
Insurance Fund of the State of Utah, 
and the Second Injury Fund of the 
State of Utah, Defendants. 
No. 20141. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 7, 1985. 
Plaintiff, who was injured in an indus-
trial accident in an underground coal mine, 
filed a claim for permanent.partial disabili-
ty benefits. The administrative law judge 
denied plaintiffs request and the Industrial 
Commission affirmed, and plaintiff appeal-
ed. The Supreme Court, 681 P.2d 208, 
reversed and remanded. On remand, the 
administrative law judge entered an order 
awarding plaintiff permanent total disabili-
ty benefits. Plaintiff then made a motion 
for reconsideration requesting inclusion of 
interest on the award for past-due benefits. 
The administrative law judge denied the 
motion, and plaintiff appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Hall, C.J., held that statute 
providing for interest payments on past-
due workers' compensation benefits applied 
to action seeking benefits for injury sus-
tained before passage of the statute. 
Reversed. 
Stewart, J., concurred in the result 
1. Workers' Compensation <3=»60 
In worker's compensation cases bene-
fits to be awarded to an injured worker are 
to be determined on basis of the suit as it 
existed at time of the injury. 
2. Statutes <$=»265, 266 
A later statute or amendment should 
not be applied in a retroactive manner to 
deprive a party of his rights or impose 
greater liability upon him. 
INDUSTRIAL COM'N OF STATE OF UTAH Utah 581 
Cite a* 704 P^d 581 (Utah 1985) 
. 3. Statutes <3=>267(2) 
Statutes which operate in furtherance 
of a remedy already existing and which 
neither create new rights nor destroy exist-
ing rights are applied retrospectively to 
accrued or pending actions to further legis-
lature's remedial purpose unless a contrary 
legislative intent is manifested. 
4. Statutes <s=>265, 267(2) 
Statutes enacted subsequent to initi-
ation of a suit which do not enlarge, elimi-
nate, or destroy vested or contractual 
rights apply not only to future actions, but 
also to accrued and pending actions as well. 
5. Workers' Compensation <s=>63 
Statute providing for interest pay-
ments on past-due workers' compensation 
benefits applied to action seeking benefits 
for injury sustained before passage of the 
statute. U.C.A. 1953, 35-1-78. 
Virginius Dabney, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Salt Lake 
City, for Industrial Com'n. 
James R. Black, Salt Lake City, for State 
Ins. Fund. 
Gilbert A. Martinez, Salt Lake City, for 
Second Injury Fund. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff appeals a decision of the Indus-
trial Commission denying him interest on 
past due benefits. Interest was denied on 
the ground that plaintiff's injury occurred 
before passage of the statute providing for 
interest payments. U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-
78 (Supp.1983). We reverse. 
On January 25, 1980, plaintiff was in-
jured in an industrial accident in an under-
ground coal mine. He was paid temporary 
total disability benefits from March 1,1980, 
to November 14, 1980. On July 1, 1981, 
plaintiff filed a claim for permanent partial 
disability benefits and an application for 
hearing with the Industrial Commission. A 
hearing was held on July 12, 1982. On 
February 4, 1983, the administrative law 
judge (ALJ) denied plaintiffs request for a 
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finding of entitlement to permanent total 
disability benefits. The Industrial Commis-
sion affirmed the ALJ's order. Plaintiff 
then appealed to this Court. The Court 
reversed, finding that plaintiff was entitled 
to permanent disability benefits.1 On re-
mand, the ALI entered an order awarding 
plaintiff permanent total disability benefits. 
Plaintiff then made a motion for recon-
sideration requesting the ALI to include 
interest of 8% per annum on the award for 
past due benefits. The ALI denied the 
motion, reasoning that since the interest 
provision was added to the statute effective 
May 12, 1981,2 and plaintiffs injury oc-
curred in 1980, the law in effect at the time 
of the injury governed the case. The ALI 
relied on the following language from Kin-
cheloe v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co..-3 "Inas-
much as the incident here concerned oc-
curred in 1980, we are bound to apply the 
law as of that date.", 
U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-78 (Supp.1983) pro-
vides in pertinent part: "Awards made by 
the industrial commission shall include in-
terest at the rate of 8% per annum from 
the date when each benefit payment would 
have otherwise become due and payable." 
Plaintiff argues that the statutory word-
ing is unambiguous:. inclusion of 8% inter-
est must be made on awards from the date 
when the payment was due regardless of 
when the injury occurred. 
[1,2] This Court has consistently held 
that in worker's compensation cases the 
benefits to be awarded to an injured work-
er are to be determined on the basis of the 
1. Marshall v. Industrial Comm'rt, Utah, 681 P.2d 
208 (1984). 
2. The amendment to the statute was passed in 
the legislative session which adjourned on 
March 12. 1981, with no specific effective date. 
Therefore, the statute became effective sixty 
days after the adjournment. Utah Const, art. 
VI, § 25. 
3. Utah, 656 P.2d 440, 442 n.5 (1982). 
4. Smith v. Industrial Comm'n, Utah, 549 P.2d 
448, 449 (1976); Utah Constr. Co. v. Matheson, 
Utah, 534 P.2d 1238, 1239 (1975); Okland 
Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, Utah, 520 P.2d 
208, 210 (1974). 
law as it.existed at the time of the injury.4 
As the Court said in Okland Construction 
Co. v. Industrial Commission:* "[A] later 
statute or amendment should not be ap-
plied in a retroactive manner to deprive a 
party of his rights or impose greater liabili-
ty upon him." 
We recognize that this rule differs from 
the general rule followed in this jurisdic-
tion which is that "the substantive law to 
be applied throughout an action is the law 
in effect at the date the action was initi-
ated*." (Emphasis added.)6 
[3,4] A contrary rule to both of the 
above applies, however, to statutes which 
operate in furtherance of a remedy already 
existing and which neither create new 
rights nor destroy existing rights. Those 
remedial statutes are applied retrospective-
ly to accrued or pending actions to further 
the legislature's remedial purpose unless a 
contrary legislative intent is manifested.* 
As the Court said in State v. Higgs:* 
[S]tatutes enacted subsequent to the ini-
tiation of a suit which do not enlarge, 
eliminate, or destroy vested or contractu-
al rights apply not only to future actions, 
but also to accrued and pending actions 
as well. 
(Emphasis added.) By implication, such 
statutes enacted before the initiation of a 
suit or claim automatically apply to suits or 
claims initiated subsequent to passage of a 
procedural or remedial statute. 
[5] The purpose of the worker's com-
pensation act is "to secure workmen . . . 
5. Suprat note 4 at 210. 
6. Department of Social Servs. v. Higgs, Utah, 656 
P.2d 998, 1000 (1982). See also Archer v. Utah 
State Land Bd., 15 Utah 2d 321, 324, 392 P.2d 
622, 624 (1964) ("[OJrdinarily the facts and the 
law in a given lawsuit are to be applied as of the 
date of the filing of the original complaint."). 
7. Pilcher v. Department of Social Servs., Utah, 
663 P.2d 450, 455 (1983); Foil v. Ballinger, Utah, 
601 P.2d 144, 151 (1979). See also Selk v. De-
troit Plastic Prod., 419 Mich. 1, 10, 345 N.W.2d 
184, 188(1984). , 
8. Supra note 6. 
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against becoming objects of charity, by 
making reasonable compensation for ca-
lamities incidental to the employment 
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9
 This payment is intended to com-
pensate the injured individual for the loss 
of employability resulting from the injury 
and is keyed to a percentage of the work-
er's average weekly wages.10 Thus, it is 
clear that compensation for worker disabili-
ty is legislation for the public welfare. It 
is also clear that the statute providing for 
interest on unpaid benefits was a legisla-
tive attempt to remedy a serious social 
problem: the depreciation of the value of 
benefits as a result of non-receipt of the 
weekly benefit for months, or perhaps 
years, until a final determination of eligibil-
ity and an award are made.11 To effect 
this purpose, the legislature could only 
have intended this remedy to apply to as 
broad a range of awards as possible. 
The ALJ in this case apparently assumed 
that payment of interest on a worker's 
compensation award was analagous to a 
new benefit since, in denying interest on 
the instant award, the ALJ relied on a 
footnote in Kincheloe n which noted that 
the law in effect at the time of the injury 
governed. 
In Kincheloe, the Court was considering 
whether the Second Injury Fund was liable 
to the plaintiff there for benefits under 
U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-69. Since, as noted 
previously, the benefits to be awarded to 
9. Marshaii, supra note 1 681 P.2d at 210-11 
(quoting Henrie v. Rocky Mountain Packing 
Corp., 113 Utah 415, 427, 196 P.2d 487, 493 
(1948)). 
10. Marshall, supra note 1, 681 P.2d at 211. 
11. Selk, 419 Mich, at 12, 345 N.W.2d, at 189. 
12. Supra, note 3. 
13. "[T]he [interest] rate applied is usually the 
rate in effect at the time interest is assessed, 
rather than the rate in effect at the time of 
injury." 3 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Com-
pensation § 83.42(a) at 15-764 (1983) (footnotes 
omitted). 
14. Selk, supra note 7. Cf. Myers v. Carr Constr. 
Co., Fla.App., 387 So.2d 417 (1980); Jeannette 
Foods, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal 
Bd., 39 Pa.Commw. 107, 394 A.2d 1309 (1978). 
an injured worker must be determined on 
the basis of the law as it existed at the time 
of the injury, the Court noted that it was 
bound to apply the law as of that date, 
even though the legislature had amended 
the law subsequent to Kincheloe's injury. 
Thus, the issue involved in Kincheloe con-
cerned substantive law. 
This line of case law is inapposite to 
interest payments on worker's compensa-
tion awards.13 Interest on a compensation 
award is incident to a right and a remedy 
that already exists.14 Retroactive applica-
tion of the statute does not alter the sub-
stance of the compensation award.15 Pay-
ment of interest on an unpaid benefit nei-
ther creates a new right nor destroys an 
existing right Therefore, interest pay-
ments should be" made on any benefits 
awarded after the effective date of the 
statute even though the injury had oc-
curred before. According to the terms of 
the statute, interest must be paid on each 
benefit payment which comprises the 
award from the date that payment would 
have been due and payable.16 
The decision of the Industrial Commis-
sion is reversed. 
HOWE, DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, 
JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result 
15. Selk, 419 Mich, at 12, 345 N.W.2d at 189. See 
also First Natl Bank v. Paul Hughes Trucking 
Co., Okla.App„ 645 P.2d 1054 (1982) (interest is 
not a benefit but a charge assessed for use of the 
claimant's money pending appeal). Cf. Ballog v. 
Knight Newspapers, Inc., 381 Mich. 527, 535, 164 
*N.W.2d 19, 22 (1969) (interest is incident to a 
right that already exists and is analogous to the 
costs and court fees of an action). 
16. We note that in cases not involving worker's 
compensation awards (eg. prejudgment inter-
est) case law is split as to whether a statute 
increasing the interest rate requires payment of 
the new interest rate from the date of injury or 
from the effective date of the amendatory act. 
See e.g„ AnnoL, 4 ALR 2d 932 (1949); Annot., 4 
ALR 2d 932, Later Case Service (1985). 
&&irv 
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would not eliminate the gap but only shift 
its impact Under plaintiffs' proposed con-
struction, we would prevent a referendum 
from being aborted due to official neglect 
but do so at the risk of permitting legisla-
tion to be aborted due to unofficial manipu-
lation. Until instructed otherwise by the 
Legislature, we prefer to construe this gap 
so as to eliminate the risk of improper 
manipulation of the referendum petition by 
private persons and to assume what we 
deem the lesser risk of improper conduct by 
duly elected officials.4 
The summary judgment for defendant is 
affirmed. No costs awarded. 
MAUGHAN, C. J., and HALL, STEW-
ART and HOWE, JJ., concur. 
( o I KqMMBERSYsTJM^ 
KAISER STEEL CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Lawrence F. MONFREDI and The 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 
Defendants. 
No. 17152. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 1, 1981. 
Employer sought review of an order of 
the Industrial Commission awarding an em-
ployee benefits for temporary total disabili-
ty on account of a back injury. The Su-
preme Court, Oaks, J., held that the Com-
missioner's finding that the employee's in-
jury and disability resulted from an "acci-
dent" was not arbitrary or capricious, whol-
ly without cause, or without any substantial 
evidence to support it. 
Affirmed. 
1. Workers'Compensation «=> 1939.4(4) 
The Supreme Court's function in re-
viewing findings of fact of Industrial 
the question is not whether the court agrees 
with the Commission's findings or whether 
they are supported by the preponderance of 
evidence but whether the findings are 
"arbitrary or capricious," or "wholly without 
cause" or contrary to the "one inevitable 
conclusion from the evidence" or without 
"any substantial evidence" to support them; 
only then should the findings be displaced. 
2. Workers' Compensation <3=» 1716 
Meaning of "accident" for workmen's 
compensation purposes is question of law; 
whether evidence conforms to that meaning 
is question of fact. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
3. Workers' Compensation $=>1533, 1653 
Industrial Commission's finding that 
employee's back injury and temporary total 
disability resulted from "accident" was not 
arbitrary or capricious, wholly without 
cause, or without any substantial evidence 
to support it. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
Steven E. Clyde, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff. 
David L. Wilkinson, Salt Lake City, Mar-
lynn B. Lema, Priee, for defendants. 
OAKS, Justice: 
This is a writ of review to set aside an 
order of the Industrial Commission in a 
claim for workmen's compensation. The or-
der directed the employer to pay $2,532,94 
plus medical expenses to an employee who 
was totally disabled for three months with 
a back injury. The employer seeks reversal 
of that order. 
The administrative law judge, whose 
findings and conclusions were affirmed by 
the Industrial Commission, found (1) that 
"there was a definite identifiable injury to 
the Applicant's low back on January 5, 
1979"; (2) that "the Applicant was tempo-
rarily totally disabled" from that date until 
April 4, 1979; and (3) that "Applicant is 
entitled to workmen's compensation bene-
fits as a result of his industrial accident of 
Commission is a strictly limited one in which January 5, 1979 . . . . " ! The employer ar-
4. We express no opinion on whether the man-
damus remedy currently available under U.R. 
C.P., Rule 65B(b)(3) or any other remedy would 
be available to compel action by a clerk who 
declined to perform his or her statutory func-
tion in time for the proponents of a petition to 
meet the deadline under § 20-11-24. 
I. The administrative law judge also found that 
applicant had a 15 percent permanent physicaJ 
impairment "based on moderate rigidity of the 
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KAISER STEEL 
Cite as, Utah, 
gues that the applicant's disability resulted 
from a preexisting physical condition rather 
than an identifiable "accident . . . in the 
course of his employment" as required by 
U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45.2 The issue on ap-
peal—whether the applicant was injured by 
an "accident"—is a question of fact which 
turns on the findings of the Commission 
and the evidence before it. 
The governing statutes (1) require the 
Commission to make written findings of 
fact, and (2) provide that the "findings and 
conclusions of the commission on questions 
of fact shall be conclusive and final and 
shall not be subject to review," § 35-1-85, 
except where "the findings of fact do not 
support the award." § 35-1-84(2). The 
meaning of that exception was defined in 
the leading case of Kavalinakis v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 67 Utah 174, 181-82, 184, 246 P. 
698, 700, 701 (1926), as follows: 
What we hold is that in case . . . we are 
asked to overturn the findings and con-
clusions of the commission which appear 
to be in conflict with or contrary to the 
evidence, it must be clearly made to ap-
pear to us that the commission acted arbi-
trarily or capriciously and wholly without 
cause in rejecting or in refusing to give 
effect to the evidence.... Any other 
conclusion would make this court merely 
a reviewing court with power to weigh 
the probative effect of the evidence.... 
lumbar spine accompanied by associated pro-
gressive degenerative disease of the lumbar 
spine'* due to accidental injury, disease or con-
genital causes existing prior to the January 5, 
1979, injury. 
2. "Every employee . . . who is injured . . . by 
accident arising out of or in the course of his 
employment . . . shall be entitled to [compensa-
tion and medical expenses}." U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 35-1-45. 
3. E. g., McPhie v. Indus. Comm'n, Utah, 567 
P26 153 (1977); McWilliams v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 21 Utah 2d 266, 444 P.2d 513 (1968); 
Garner v. Hecla Mining Company, 19 Utah 2d 
367, 431 P.2d 794 (1967); Baker v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (1965); 
Western Contracting Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 
15 Utah 2d 208, 390 P.2d 125 (1964); Dalton v. 
Indus. Comm'n, 8 Utah 2d 353, 334 P.2d 763 
(1959); Lorange v. Indus. Comm'n, 107 Utah 
>RP. v. MONFREDI Utah 889 
631P.2d888 
Unless therefore it can be said, upon the 
whole record, that the commission clearly 
acted arbitrarily or capriciously in mak-
ing its findings and decision, this court is 
powerless to interfere. Such is the mani-
fest purpose and intent of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act. . . . It was not in-
tended, . . . that this Court, in matters of 
evidence, should to any extent substitute 
its judgment for the judgment of the 
commission. 
The Kavalinakis declaration that the Com-
mission will be sustained in its findings of 
fact unless its action was "arbitrary or ca-
pricious" has been cited repeatedly as the 
appropriate standard by which this Court 
reviews the Commission's findings of fact.3 
In many subsequent cases, this Court has 
also reaffirmed that the reviewing court 
does not weigh the probative "effect of con-
flicting evidence before the Commission.4 
Similarly, the reviewing court will survey 
the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the Commission's findings and order.5 Sub-
sequent courts have also reaffirmed the Ka-
valinakis statement that under the Work-
men's Compensation Act this Court should 
not "to any extent substitute the judgment 
of the court upon factual matters for the 
judgment of the commission."6 Thus, for 
example, this Court has repeatedly held 
that it cannot substitute its judgment for 
the Commission's on which of two possible 
261, 153 P.2d 272 (1944); Kelly v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 80 Utah 73, 12 P.2d 1112 (1932). 
4. E. g., Wiseman v. Village Partners, Utah, 589 
P.2d 754 (1978); dinger v. Indus. Comm'n, 
Utah, 571 P.2d 1328 (1977); Russell v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 86 Utah 306, 43 P.2d 1069 (1935); 
Ogden Union Ry. v. Indus. Comm'n, 85 Utah 
124, 38 P.2d 766 (1934); Parker v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 78 Utah 509, 5 P.2d 573 (1931). 
5. E. g., Chadwick v. Indus. Comm'n, Utah, 572 
P.2d 400, 402 (1977); Savage v. Indus. 
Comm'n, Utah, 565 P.2d 782, 783 (1977); Ship-
ley v. C. & W Contracting Co., Utah, 528 P.2d 
153, 155 (1974), and cases cited therein. 
6. E. g.. Kent v. Indus. Comm'n, 89 Utah 381; 
386, 57 P.2d 724 (1936). 
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inferences should be drawn from the evi-
dence.7 
There are at least two other much-cited 
descriptions of this Court's scope of review 
of Commission findings of fact. In Kent v. 
Indus. Comm'n, 89 Utah 381, 385, 57 P.2d 
724, 725 (1936), a unanimous Court de-
clared: 
In case of an award of compensation, 
all the record is required to disclose is 
* that there is sufficient, competent, mate-
rial evidence in the record to support the 
award. That there is a conflict in the 
evidence, or that this court might or 
would have found differently had the evi-
dence been submitted to it as a trier of 
the facts, is of no consequence. The In-
dustrial Commission is a fact-finding 
body, and in case there is any substantial 
evidence to support its findings, its find-
ings are conclusive upon this court and 
may not be disturbed. 
In Noma v. Indus. Comm'n, 90 Utah 256, 
260-61, 61 P.2d 413, 415 (1936), the Court 
defined its function as follows: 
Where the matter presented on appeal 
is the question of whether the commission 
should have in law arrived at a conclusion 
of fact different from that at which it did 
arrive from the evidence, a question of 
law is presented only when it is claimed 
that the commission could only arrive at 
% one conclusion from the evidence, and 
that it found contrary to that inevitable 
conclusion. 
Writing for the Court, Justice Wolfe out-
lined six criteria which had to combine in 
order to justify reversing the Commission, 
such as uncontradicted evidence in opposi-
tion to its position, and then continued: 
If the commission should decide against 
the uncontradicted evidence under those 
conditions, its decision would as a matter 
of law be arbitrary and capricious, which 
is another way of saying that it would be 
unreasonable. 
[1] Under any of these standards— Kava-
linakis, Kent, or Norris—it is apparent that 
7, Pace v. Indus. Comm'n, 87 Utah 6, 47 P.2d 
1050 (1935); Park Utah Consoi Mines Co. v. 
Indus. Comm'n, 84 Utah 481, 36 P.2d 979 
this Court's function in reviewing Commis-
sion findings of fact is a strictly limited one 
in which the question is not whether the 
Court agrees with the Commission's find-
ings or whether they are supported by the 
preponderance of evidence. Instead, the re-
viewing court's inquiry is whether the Com- ~ 
mission's findings are "arbitrary or capri-
cious," or "wholly without cause" or con-
trary to the "one [inevitable] conclusion 
from the evidence" or without "any sub-
stantial evidence" to support them0 Only 
then should the Commission's findings be 
displaced. 
[2] Applying those standards, we turn 
to the record to see whether there is the 
requisite support for the Commission's find-
ing that the applicant sustained a "definite 
identifiable injury" (or "accident"—the 
terms are used interchangeably in the find-
ings—) on the job on January 5, 1979. This 
requires a preliminary inquiry into the 
meaning of the word accident in § 35-1-45. 
The meaning of this word is a question of 
law; whether the evidence conforms to that 
meaning is a question of fact. 
The leading case on the meaning of "acci-
dent" is Carling v. Industrial Commission, 
16 Utah 2d 260, 261-62, 399 P.2d 202, 203 
(1965), a unanimous opinion in which this 
Court declared: 
[T]his court has held that for the purpose 
of the Act [the term "accident"] should 
be given a broad meaning. It connotes 
an unanticipated, unintended occurrence 
different from what would normally be 
expected to occur in the usual course of 
events. We recognize the correctness of 
plaintiffs contention that even though 
there must be some such "accident" with-
in the meaning of that statute, this is not 
necessarily restricted to some single inci-
dent which happened suddenly at one 
particular time and does not preclude the 
possibility that due to exertion, stress or 
other repetitive cause, a climax might be 
reached in such manner as to properly 
(1934); Parker v. Indus. Comm'n, 78 Utah 509, 
5 P.2d 573 (1931); and cases'cited therein. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
KAISER STEEL CO 
Cite as, Utah, 
fall within the definition of an accident 
as just stated above. However, such an 
occurrence must be distinguished from 
gradually developing conditions which are 
classified as occupational diseases and 
which are not compensable except as pro-
vided in [§ 35-2-1, et seq.]. 
This Court has held that the aggravation of 
a preexisting disability of the back by the 
performance of an employee's usual and 
customary work is not compensable as an 
"accident" where there was no "interven-
tion of any unusual event or trauma."8 On 
the other hand, this Court has also applied 
the Carling definition by declaring that 
even though a back injury is related to a 
preexisting deficiency or disease, "if there 
is an incident, properly regarded as an acci-
dent in the course of work which adds to or 
aggravates that condition, any resulting in-
jury is compensable."9 
As suggested by the contrast between 
those two cases, the application of the "acci-
dent" requirement to back injuries has been 
particularly vexing to this Court and to the 
Commission. In fact, this is at least the 
ninth back injury case that has come to this 
Court from the Commission in less than 30 
months,10 and in most of these cases the 
Court has been sharply divided, often on 
whether or not the disability was the result 
of an "accident" or merely the consequence 
of a preexisting condition. * 
The facts of one of these back cases, U.S. 
Steel Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, Utah, 607 
P.2d 807 (1980), are remarkably similar to 
the facts in the case now before the Court. 
In U.S. Steely the employee "felt a pop in 
his back" as he was reaching under a con-
veyor belt in the course of shoveling ore 
from under the belt. His injury was diag-
nosed as a herniated disk. The Commission 
found that the employee's temporary dis-
8. Farmers Grain Co-op v. Mason, Utah, 606 
P.2d 237, 239 (1980). 
9. United States Steel Corp. v. Draper, Utah, 
613 P.2d 508, 509 (1980). Accord, Nuzum v. 
Roosendahl Const & Min. Corp., Utah, 565 
P.2d 1144, 1146(1977). 
10. Entwhistle v. Indus. Comm'n, Utah, 626 P.2d 
495 (1981); Painter Motor Co. v. Ostler, Utah, 
»RP. v. MONFREDI Utah 891 
631 P.2d888 
ability had resulted from an industrial acci-
dent, and this Court unanimously affirmed 
an award for temporary total disability. 
[3] The record evidence in this case 
showed that at the start of his shift in the 
mine on January 5, 1979, the applicant, 
Monfredi, was scaling rock from the roof of 
the mine and shoveling it onto a conveyor 
belt. In the hearing before the Commis-
sion, he was questioned about whether 
there was any particular or unusual inci-
dent or act that he could specify as causing 
his injury, such as breaking a shovel or 
slipping on a rock. He gave this answer: 
No. I was just shoveling onto the belt. 
Shoveling that rock. I was scaling down 
the rock by the beltline, and I was shovel-
ing it onto the belt. Cleaning it up. . . . 
Well, I was right by the belt. You know. 
I got my shovel, and was scaling down 
some rock. Then, when I went to shovel 
like this, there was a catch in my back. 
Right here in the lower back. (Indicat-
ing) . . . 
It went about halfway. If it had went 
out entirely, they would have had to 
carry me out. But it was just half out. 
The company doctor who examined the ap-
plicant reported "Lumbar Syndrome . . . 
general spinal arthritis and possible disco-
genic disease," predicting a one-week re-
turn to work. When the lower back pain 
prevented the applicant's return in that pe-
riod, he was examined by a specialist and 
hospitalized for about a week. A myelo-
gram was performed "with findings of shal-
low but consistent extradural defect at the 
L4-5 interspace level consistent with disk 
protrusion without other demonstrated ab-
normality." The final discharge diagnosis 
was "herniated lumbar disk." 
617 P.2d 975 (1980); Schmidt v. Indus. 
Comm'n, Utah. 617 P.2d 693 (1980); U.S. Steel 
v. Indus. Comm'n, Utah, 607 P.2d 807 (1980); 
Farmer's Grain Co-op v. Mason, Utah, 606 P.2d 
237 (1980); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. Indus. Comm'n, Utah, 590 P.2d 
328 (1979); Wiseman v. Village Partners, Utah, 
589 P.2d 754 (1978); Buxton v. Indus. Comm'n, 
Utah. 587 P.2d 121 (1978). 
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The applicant had worked as a miner for 
this employer for about 27 years. Until 
1978, he had been a roof bolter. He had a 
history of back problems associated with his 
work. In 1965, he was examined by the 
company doctor for pain in the lumber re-
gion after lifting a duke. In 1968, he was 
examined twice, once after feeling a pinch 
in his lower back as he was lifting a big 
rock from under the conveyor belt, and once 
for lower back pain after he grabbed for a 
rock on the conveyor belt. Company medi-
cal reports also showed that in 1969 he 
twisted his back as he was shoveling rock 
along the face of the coal seam, in 1970 he 
sustained a strain to his lower back as he 
was pulling a grease bucket from under a 
conveyor belt, and in 1971 he felt a pinch in 
his lower back while he was lifting a sack of 
rock dust. Again that same year, he in-
jured his back (which "went out" as he 
described it) while lifting steel beams. Ac-
cording to the applicant's statement, all of 
these injuries were covered by workmen's 
compensation. 
The applicant's history of work-related 
accidents and his medical condition showed 
a job-induced preexisting condition which 
could have been added to or aggravated, 
United States Steel Corp. v. Draper, Utah, 
613 P.2d 508, 509 (1980), by the work-relat-
ed incident that occurred on January 5, 
1979, or which could have reached what this 
Court has referred to as a "climax" due to 
"exertion, stress, or other repetitive cause 
. . . in such manner as to properly fall 
within the definition of an accident . . .," 
Carling v. Indus. Comm'n, quoted supra. In 
the almost identical circumstance in U.S. 
Steel Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, supra,—a pop 
in the back suffered while reaching to shov-
el under a conveyor belt—this Court unani-
mously affirmed an award for temporary 
total disability. 
Mindful of the "recognized rule of con-
struction [that] resolves any doubt respect-
ing the right of compensation in favor of 
the injured employee or his dependents," 
and the principle that "the compensation 
statutes should be liberally construed in fa-
vor of recovery," McPhie v. Indus. Comm 'n, 
Utah, 567 P.2d 153, 155 (1977), we cannot 
conclude that the Commission's finding that 
applicant's injury and disability resulted 
from an "accident" was "arbitrary or capri-
cious" or "wholly without cause" or without 
"any substantial evidence" to support it 
The Commission's order is therefore af-
firmed. 
MAUGHAN, C. J., and HALL, STEW-
ART and HOWE, JJ., concur. 
rw 
(o 6 KEY NUM8ER SYSTEM} ' 
Cheater V. BUTTARS, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
Asael M. BUTTARS, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 17136. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 2, 1981. 
In an action to quiet title, the First 
District Court, Cache County, VeNoy Chris-
toffersen, J., found for defendant. On ap-
peal by the plaintiff, the Supreme Court, 
Oaks, J., held that where son held land in 
fee simple determinable, with his estate to 
terminate by special limitation if he should 
fail to pay and perform his $500 per year 
obligation to his mother, and he admittedly 
paid only seven of 14 annual payments, 
district court, citing "special relationship" 
existing between son and his mother and 
fact that he performed many personal and 
business services for her each year could 
find for son on basis of waiver and satisfae-
tion and could therefore find that son's 
estate did not terminate. 
Affirmed. 
Stewart, J., concurred in result. 
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